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ABSTRACT 
  Because of fundamental changes in the nature of immigration 
enforcement over the past decade, an increasing number of 
interactions between law enforcement agents and noncitizens in the 
United States are ultimately adjudicated not in criminal courts, but in 
immigration courts. Unfortunately, unlike the state and federal courts 
that have long performed an oversight function with regard to police 
activity, immigration courts were not designed to police the police. As 
a result, there are inadequate mechanisms in place to address many of 
the rights violations that are occurring in the context of immigration 
enforcement. This Article explores the procedural deficiencies of the 
current system and offers some proposals to address this growing 
problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Absent the applicability of the exclusionary rule, questions 
relating to deportability routinely involve simple factual allegations 
and matters of proof. When Fourth Amendment issues are raised at 
deportation hearings, the result is a diversion of attention from the 
main issues which those proceedings were created to resolve, both in 
terms of the expertise of the administrative decision makers and of 
the structure of the forum to accommodate inquiries into search and 
seizure questions. The result frequently seems to be a long, confused 
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record in which the issues are not clearly defined and in which there 
is voluminous testimony.1 
This is an era of unprecedented immigration enforcement. Never 
before in the history of the United States has the government 
removed so many noncitizens in so short a time frame. Between 2003 
and 2008, the U.S. government removed 1,446,338 noncitizens from 
the United States.2 And not all noncitizens placed in removal 
proceedings were ultimately removed. Removals are merely the tip of 
the iceberg with regard to enforcement actions. For every noncitizen 
who receives a formal order of removal, another four depart 
“voluntarily” as a result of their encounters with the immigration 
enforcement bureaucracy.3 At the same time, federal prosecutions of 
immigration crimes in criminal courts have reached an all-time high. 
Over the past five years, immigration crimes have risen to the top of 
the list of federal prosecutions, and now make up more than half of 
the federal criminal docket.4 
 
 1. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1984) (quoting In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. 
Dec. 70, 79–80 (B.I.A. 1979)). 
 2. The government removed 358,886 noncitizens in 2008, 319,382 in 2007, 280,974 in 2006, 
246,431 in 2005, 240,665 in 2004, and 211,098 in 2003. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 (2008), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf. The 
first year in which annual removals exceeded 200,000 was 2003. Id. Removals exceeded 100,000 
for the first time in 1997. Id. 
  Until 1996, immigration proceedings to prevent noncitizens from entering the country 
were termed “exclusion” proceedings, whereas proceedings to remove a noncitizen that had 
already entered the country were termed “deportation” proceedings. See STEPHEN H. 
LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 
420–21 (5th ed. 2009). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.), consolidated exclusion and deportation, and 
labeled the resulting proceedings “removal” proceedings. Now, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3) indicates 
that the removal proceedings defined in that section are for determining “whether an alien may 
be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United 
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3) (2006). This Article will therefore use the term “removal” to refer 
to deportation and exclusion. 
 3. In 2008, 811,263 noncitizens voluntarily departed, 891,390 noncitizens voluntarily 
departed in 2007, 1,043,381 noncitizens voluntarily departed in 2006, 1,096,920 noncitizens 
voluntarily departed in 2005, 1,166,576 noncitizens voluntarily departed in 2004, and 945,294 
noncitizens voluntarily departed in 2003. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 
95. Unlike formal removal statistics, voluntary departure statistics have been fairly constant 
over the past thirty years. Id. 
 4. John Schwartz, Immigration Enforcement Fuels Spike in U.S. Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
22, 2009, at A16. 
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Numerous agencies and adjudicators participate in the 
enforcement actions that have yielded this unprecedented wave of 
removals and convictions. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a 
branch of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is 
responsible for many of the apprehensions that take place on or near 
the border.5 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), another 
branch of DHS, is responsible for a great deal of the enforcement that 
takes place in the interior of the country, although they perform 
functions at the border as well.6 In recent years, ICE and CBP have 
increasingly collaborated with law enforcement agents outside of the 
immigration enforcement bureaucracy—including the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA), and numerous state and local law enforcement agencies—to 
facilitate interior enforcement efforts.7 Whether an individual is 
detained at the border or in the interior, many noncitizens remain in 
detention pending the resolution of their claims, and ICE is 
responsible for managing this detention.8 
Immigration officers and other cooperating law enforcement 
officers in the field engage in forms of policing that are entirely 
familiar in the realm of criminal investigations, including conducting 
brief stops of individuals suspected of immigration violations; full 
arrest upon probable cause of these violations; consensual 
questioning; and, with cause, interrogations concerning immigration 
status.9 But what happens when these agents run afoul of 
constitutional protections in the process of investigating immigration 
violations or in the course of detaining noncitizens? For a noncitizen 
facing a criminal trial, the answer would be clear. The noncitizen 
could raise allegations of constitutional rights violations, and if a 
 
 5. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 3; Customs and Border Patrol, This Is 
CBP, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbp_is.xml (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) 
(discussing typical daily apprehensions). 
 6. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 3. 
 7. See, e.g., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security 
Task Forces (BEST), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter BEST] (describing collaboration with “Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives; Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Coast Guard; and the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office along with other key federal, state, local and foreign law enforcement 
agencies”); U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE ACCESS, http://www.ice.gov/ 
partners/dro/iceaccess.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter ICE ACCESS] (describing 
its collaboration with state and local law enforcement). 
 8. BEST, supra note 7. 
 9. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 649–50. 
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violation was established, he might well be able to argue that 
evidence illegally obtained in contravention of these constitutional 
protections ought to be suppressed for purposes of adjudicating the 
case against him. 
But in hundreds of thousands of cases each year, noncitizens are 
processed not in criminal courts, but in civil courts. Indeed, because 
of fundamental changes in the nature of immigration enforcement 
over the past decade, many of the interactions between law 
enforcement officials and noncitizens in the United States lead to 
matters that are ultimately adjudicated not in criminal courts, but in 
immigration courts.10 
Once an individual has been served with a notice to appear 
(NTA) in a civil removal proceeding,11 his case is adjudicated by an 
immigration judge (IJ) who sits within the Executive Office of 
Immigration Appeals, which is in turn under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Justice.12 The steep rise in immigration enforcement 
has had a substantial impact on the workload of IJs. In fiscal year 
2008, the immigration judges completed 274,469 removal 
proceedings.13 Just over 200 IJs perform all of this work.14 Unlike 
 
 10. The focus of this Article is on civil removal proceedings, but it is worth bearing in mind 
that the rise in criminal prosecutions also creates stresses on federal prosecutors and magistrate 
judges. For a discussion of the rising caseload and the most affected areas of the country, see 
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS AT 
RECORD LEVELS IN FY 2009 (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/218/. Moreover, the 
procedures designed to facilitate these convictions raise fundamental questions of fairness and 
due process. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 135, 147 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/109/135_ 
Chacon.pdf. The prosecution of immigration crimes also is facilitated by synergies with the civil 
enforcement mechanisms used to effectuate removal. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting 
Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 68–75, on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (describing the relationships between criminal prosecution and immigration 
enforcement); see also Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms 
and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 618 (2003) (describing this trend by noting 
that “the [term] ‘criminalization’ of immigration law fails to capture the dynamic process by 
which both systems converge at points to create a new system of social control that draws from 
both immigration and criminal justice, but it is purely neither”). 
 11. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2009); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 650 
(noting that NTAs are often served by ICE, but can be served by “a range of other DHS 
agencies and officials”). 
 12. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 13. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 
2008 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK C4 tbl.4 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/stats 
pub/fy08syb.pdf. The figure shown above for removal proceedings includes a small numbers of 
“exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings. Id. 
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federal judges, these IJs do not have a cadre of law clerks to assist 
them; there are currently only fifty-six law clerks available to the 
nation’s IJs.15 And these IJs face additional constraints—such as a 
very high number of unrepresented and non–English-speaking 
litigants and a lack of administrative support staff—that further 
complicate their dockets and increase the burden of their workload.16 
Immigration judges have long faced fairly heavy dockets.17 In 
recent years, however, the complexity of the docket has also 
increased. For example, because an increasing number of noncitizens 
in removal proceedings are detained, IJs must now adjudicate a 
number of legal claims related to matters of detention. One sign of 
this is the significant number of bond-related matters that IJs now 
hear. In 2008, they adjudicated 44,736 bond redetermination 
hearings.18 IJs must often decide these matters in isolation from 
determinations of the merits of the noncitizen’s removal case.19 
But another important shift in the immigration docket in recent 
years is the rise in the number of cases in which noncitizens raise 
allegations of government misconduct in the course of investigating 
immigration violations. Unfortunately, unlike state and federal 
courts, which have long overseen police activity, immigration courts 
were not designed to police the police. As the Supreme Court noted 
 
 14. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 
1651–52 (2010). 
 15. Id. at 1652. 
 16. Id. at 1652–53. 
 17. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Court recorded that “[t]he 
average immigration judge handles about six deportation hearings per day.” Id. at 1048. 
 18. EOIR, supra note 13, at C4 tbl.4, B7 fig.3. The Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR) figures also note that in 2008, IJs decided 13,294 motions to reopen and other 
motions. Id.; see also Legomsky, supra note 14, at 1651–54 (providing more examples of the 
strain on IJs). 
 19. Bond proceedings are not part of a removal proceeding; they are separate proceedings. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (2009) (“Consideration by the Immigration Judge of an application or 
request of a respondent regarding custody or bond under this section shall be separate and apart 
from, and shall form no part of, any deportation or removal hearing or proceeding.”). Unless a 
noncitizen is subject to mandatory detention under the criminal or terrorism grounds of section 
236(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006), the INA 
provides for the release of noncitizens arrested for immigration violations on bond or on their 
own recognizance pending resolution of their removal matter, INA § 236(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(a)(2). An ICE official makes the initial custody and bond determination, INA § 236.1(d), 8 
U.S.C. § 1236.1(d); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d), but at any time prior to the final removal order, a 
noncitizen may apply for bond redetermination by an immigration judge, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d), 
1003.19(a), 1236.1(d). 
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in its 1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,20 “a deportation 
hearing is intended to provide a streamlined determination of 
eligibility to remain in this country, nothing more.”21 
The executive branch—in cooperation with law enforcement 
agents at all levels of government—has fundamentally transformed 
the nature of immigration enforcement over the past decade, but 
immigration adjudication has not evolved to meet the growing 
challenge of overseeing ongoing and widespread interagency 
immigration policing in the interior of the United States. Not only do 
IJs face the tremendous resource constraints previously described, 
but the remedies that they can provide in cases in which an 
individual’s rights have been violated in the investigation stage are 
also heavily constrained by a body of law that formed at a time when 
immigration enforcement looked very different than it does today.22 
This Article explores the procedural deficiencies of the current 
system and offers some proposals to address the growing problems 
created by the mismatch between enforcement realities and the 
adjudicative capacity and competence of the immigration courts. 
Part I of this Article discusses two trends in immigration 
enforcement that have created a situation in which many interactions 
between noncitizens and the state lead to matters that are ultimately 
adjudicated not in criminal courts, but in immigration courts. The first 
trend, discussed in Section I.A, is the rapid expansion of immigration 
enforcement efforts, particularly outside of border areas. The second 
trend, discussed in Section I.B, is the increasing permeability of the 
border between immigration enforcement and crime-control 
measures. As a consequence of these two developments, immigration 
enforcement actions now number over 300,000 each year in the civil 
realm, in addition to the tens of thousands of cases that are handled in 
the criminal sphere. The law enforcement officials participating in 
these actions include not only ICE and CBP but also a wide range of 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies whose primary 
functions are outside of the realm of immigration enforcement. 
Part II of this Article discusses the specific ways in which state 
and local police have become involved in a wide variety of 
 
 20. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
 21. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added). 
 22. As discussed below, many of the assumptions about immigration enforcement 
underlying the Lopez-Mendoza decision are no longer valid in light of evolving enforcement 
practices. See infra Part III.B. 
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immigration enforcement efforts. This Part analyzes evolving models 
of federal-local cooperation and also offers a preliminary discussion 
of some of the legal issues that have arisen as a result of local-state-
federal law enforcement cooperation, including increasingly 
widespread allegations of racial profiling and other constitutional 
violations. 
Drawing upon these examples of local-federal cooperation, Part 
III of the Article seeks to provide a procedural explanation for the 
increasing allegations of rights violations that have occurred in the 
context of immigration enforcement efforts. This Part traces out the 
legal incentive structures that produce some of the negative 
consequences of the cooperative enforcement described in Part II. 
Not only do constitutional violations lack remedies in removal 
proceedings comparable to those available in the criminal sphere, but 
immigration enforcement agents also have broader authority to 
conduct investigative stops because they are empowered to enforce 
civil immigration law as well as criminal law. As state and local law 
enforcement become more engaged in immigration policing, the lack 
of alignment between immigration policing powers and criminal 
policing powers and the asymmetrical nature of remedies raise new 
concerns. Nonfederal actors who are using immigration enforcement 
powers to achieve their criminal law objectives are able to circumvent 
some of the constitutional baselines that apply to criminal policing 
without confronting the sanctions that would be available in the 
criminal system. 
The final Part of the Article proposes policy reforms to address 
the procedural problems previously identified. Part IV.A suggests the 
application of the exclusionary rule to removal proceedings. 
Ultimately, however, many of the rights claims arising out of local-
federal cooperation in immigration enforcement exceed the core 
competencies and capacities of the immigration courts that handle the 
bulk of these claims. There is a need for comprehensive reform of the 
immigration adjudication structure. Part IV.B urges a reform of the 
administrative structure of immigration adjudication and discusses 
the need to guarantee counsel in at least some subset of removal 
proceedings.23 Part IV also proposes mechanisms for increasing the 
oversight of immigration policing outside of the immigration court 
system. Part IV.C explores two options: expanded availability of 
class-action remedies in federal district court and improved agency 
 
 23. See infra Part IV.B. 
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oversight procedures for federal immigration enforcement agents.24 
Ultimately, the task of bringing immigration adjudication into 
alignment with the modern realities of immigration policing will 
require a comprehensive approach. 
I.  THE RISE AND REFORMULATION  
OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Immigration enforcement has waxed and waned throughout the 
past century in the United States, but it has exploded over the past 
decade. Enforcement has morphed from a small and border-centered 
endeavor into a huge effort involving a network of law enforcement 
agencies operating throughout the country. Perhaps more 
significantly, immigration enforcement has transformed into a crucial 
adjunct to, if not a substitute for, criminal law enforcement in matters 
involving noncitizens. This Part traces both of these trends and 
outlines their practical effects. 
A. The Rising Tide of Immigration Enforcement 
In fiscal year 2008, the U.S. government spent billions of dollars 
on immigration enforcement activities. Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement, the agency responsible for immigration enforcement 
activities in the interior of the country, had a budget of 
$5,014,500,000.25 Customs and Border Protection, which includes the 
Border Patrol, as well as other enforcement agencies focusing on the 
flow of goods and people across the U.S. borders, had a budget of 
$10,174,114,000.26 The two agencies combined therefore had 
operating budgets of over $15 billion in fiscal year 2008.27 By way of 
comparison, in 1998, the budget for the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) was just over $3.6 billion.28 This figure 
includes immigration services that are now provided by Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (CIS) and are not included in the $15 
 
 24. See infra Part IV.C. 
 25. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 19 (2008), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2008.pdf. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. This number does not include interdiction activities carried out by the Coast Guard, 
which carries out interdictions of noncitizens at sea. The Coast Guard accounted for an 
additional 18.9 percent of the DHS budget. Id. 
 28. Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, An Overview of Federal Drug Control Programs 
on the Southwest Border: Immigration and Naturalization Service, http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
ondcppubs/publications/enforce/border/ins_3.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
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billion figure above. Additionally, although these budget figures 
reflect DHS spending on investigations, prosecutions, detention, and 
removal, they do not reflect all of the federal costs of immigration 
enforcement, given the costs of prosecuting and punishing 
immigration crimes in criminal courts. Even so, the $15 billion budget 
for ICE and CBP represents a budget increase of over 500 percent in 
the past decade, and more than a 1,500 percent increase since 1988.29 
Even as federal immigration enforcement is expanding, the 
nature of that enforcement is changing. Internal enforcement 
measures have seen a significant increase in budget and prominence 
in the U.S. government’s immigration control strategy, particularly 
over the past five years.30 Prior to September 11, 2001, the INS had 
fewer than two thousand agents to enforce immigration laws in the 
interior of the United States.31 Although the agency had expanded 
significantly over the preceding two decades, that expansion was 
primarily in the realm of border enforcement.32 As the contemporary 
CBP budget suggests, significant resources are still dedicated to 
border enforcement, but over the past decade, interior enforcement 
has become an increasingly important component of immigration 
enforcement. In 2010, ICE will have 20,000 employees,33 many of 
whom are dedicated to internal enforcement efforts. 
 
 29. JUSTICE MGMT. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET TREND DATA: FROM 1975 
THROUGH THE PRESIDENT’S 2003 REQUEST TO THE CONGRESS 104–08 (2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975_2002/2002/pdf/BudgetTrand.pdf (showing budget 
trends for INS from 1975 to 2003 and recording an INS budget of $1.01 billion in 1988). 
 30. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) Interior Enforcement Strategy: 
Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 13 (2002) 
(statement of Richard M. Stana, Director of Justice Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office) 
(noting that up through the 1990s, five times as many resources were devoted to border 
enforcement as to interior enforcement); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 25, at 2 
(noting an unprecedented number of workplace enforcement actions in 2008). 
 31. LISA M. SEGHETTI, STEPHEN R. VIÑA & KARMA ESTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT 6 (2005), 
available at http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2005,1026-crs.pdf. 
 32. See, e.g., TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 10 (noting 
the rapid expansion of the Border Patrol in the period from the mid-1970s through 2001); INS: 
Enforcement, Detention, MIGRATION NEWS, Apr. 1998, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/MN/ 
more.php?id=1489_0_2_0 (noting that the number of Border Patrol agents doubled between 
1993 and 1998). 
 33. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE 
FISCAL YEAR 2010 ENACTED BUDGET 1 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/ 
news/factsheets/2010budgetfactsheet.doc. 
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Not only has the size of U.S. interior enforcement rapidly 
increased, but the nature of that enforcement has also changed in 
fundamental ways. As Julia Preston wrote for the New York Times in 
late 2007, “[o]ver the last two years, ICE has grown more aggressive, 
entering factories and communities, hunting down foreign fugitives 
ranging from convicted criminals to workers whose visas have 
expired.”34 Moreover, the federal immigration enforcement strategy 
has come to rely heavily upon thousands of state and local law 
enforcement agents who assist in interior immigration enforcement.35 
B. Blurring Boundaries: Immigration Enforcement as Crime Control 
The rise of interior enforcement and the participation of a wide 
array of law enforcement agents in immigration enforcement raise 
fundamental questions about age-old legal doctrines that rely on 
clear-cut distinctions between immigration law and criminal law 
enforcement. U.S. legal doctrines have historically framed 
deportation as a “civil” punishment that does not require the full 
panoply of criminal procedural protections afforded in criminal 
trials.36 As Professor Dan Kanstroom has noted, at the time that the 
Supreme Court handed down such edicts, deportation looked very 
different than it does today. Strict statutes of limitations on 
deportation were ensconced in the statute37—indeed, after a year in 
the United States, a person was no longer subject to deportation.38 
 
 34. Julia Preston, No Need for a Warrant, You’re an Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, 
§ 4 (Week in Review), at 3; see also BESS CHIU ET AL., CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON 
IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERATIONS (2009), available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/ 
uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-741/IJC_ICE-Home-Raid-
Report%20Updated.pdf (noting the constitutional problems associated with ICE home raids in 
New York and New Jersey); NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS, RAIDS ON WORKERS: DESTROYING OUR RIGHTS 13–41 (2009), 
available at http://www.icemisconduct.org/docUploads/UFCW%20ICE%20rpt%20FINAL%20 
150B_061809_130632.pdf (reporting on aggressive tactics and rights violations by ICE in the 
course of several large-scale workplace raids across the country). 
 35. Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration 
Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1161–65 (2008). For details concerning this 
cooperation, see discussion infra Part II. 
 36. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 122–24 (2007); see also, e.g., Wong 
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233 (1896) (stating that Chinese laborers did not require 
the full range of protections under the criminal justice system). 
 37. KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 125. 
 38. Id. 
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Additionally, there was almost no interior enforcement, so 
deportation primarily resulted from patrolling the borders.39 
Much has changed in the past century. Statutes of limitations for 
unlawful presence were first truncated, and then eliminated 
completely.40 Interior enforcement is now an important component of 
immigration enforcement.41 Moreover, deportation has increasingly 
come to be used as an adjunct to criminal punishment, operating as a 
means of “post-entry social control.”42 Now, when a noncitizen—even 
a lawful permanent resident—commits any one of a host of offenses, 
he often faces deportation in addition to criminal punishment.43 Since 
immigration enforcement is increasingly functioning in the interior as 
a means of achieving criminal law enforcement goals, the immigration 
consequences of detention and removal are of a punitive nature that 
belies their designation as civil.44 
The past two decades have witnessed the evolution of 
“crimmigration” law: parallel systems “in which immigration law and 
the criminal justice system are merely nominally separate.”45 The 
overlap between the two systems has several distinct manifestations, 
including a dramatic rise in the prosecution of migration-related 
criminal offenses within the criminal justice system, increasing 
reliance on removal as a collateral (or alternative) form of punishing 
crime or suspected criminality, and the use of quasi-criminal 
institutions—such as immigration detention and investigatory raids by 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 125–30. 
 41. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 42. KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 243. 
 43. See Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the 
Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 652 (2004) 
(“Deportation is now often a virtually automatic consequence of a non-citizen’s criminal 
conviction for even a minor state misdemeanor.”); Stephen Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 469, 482 (2007) (“Just as more and more immigration violations are culminating in 
criminal convictions, so too are more and more criminal convictions culminating in deportation 
or other adverse immigration consequences.”); Miller, supra note 10, at 618 (referring to this 
trend as the “immigrationization of criminal law”). 
 44. See infra notes 63–69 and accompanying text. 
 45. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). 
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numerous, heavily armed agents—in what are nominally purely civil 
immigration investigations and proceedings.46 
The spike in migration-related criminal convictions is perhaps 
one of the most notable features of the past decade of federal law 
enforcement in the United States. Immigration prosecutions are now 
the most common federal criminal prosecutions, outstripping federal 
drug and weapons prosecutions, and dwarfing many other forms of 
federal criminal prosecution.47 Indeed, recent data indicate that 
immigration offenses now make up half of federal criminal cases.48 
Illegal reentry and felony reentry are by far the most commonly 
prosecuted immigration crimes, but other immigration-related 
prosecutions are also on the rise. In spite of vocal commitment to 
immigration reform, the Obama administration has continued to 
engage in record-setting levels of immigration prosecution.49 
Prosecutions for immigration-related offenses are also unfolding 
with increasing regularity at the subfederal level. Although as a 
historical matter the federal government bears sole responsibility for 
the regulation of immigration, states and localities are increasingly 
enacting provisions that, like the federal identity-theft statute, can be 
used to target conduct associated with migrant communities.50 In 
some jurisdictions, these laws have become a means for state and 
 
 46. See Chacón, supra note 10, at 137–40 (discussing the consequences of the overlap of the 
immigration and criminal law systems). See generally Legomsky, supra note 43 (discussing five 
related trends). 
 47. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, PROSECUTION OF 
IMMIGRATION CASES SURGE IN U.S. WHILE SENTENCES SLUMP (2005), available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/131/ (“Fueled by the jump in DHS-immigration referrals in FY 
2004, immigration matters now represent the single largest group of all federal prosecutions, 
about one-third (32%) of the total. By comparison, narcotics and drugs, for many years the 
government’s dominant enforcement interest, dropped to about a quarter of the total (27%) 
and weapons matters to slightly less than one out of ten (9%).”). 
 48. Schwartz, supra note 4. 
 49. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 10. 
 50. One example is Arizona’s identity-theft law. Arizona law creates criminal culpability 
for the use of an alternate identity whether or not the defendant knows that he is using the 
identity of an actual person and whether or not another person with such an identity actually 
exists. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008 (2010). This offense is deployed as a means of 
prosecuting noncitizens who have used false identities to obtain employment. For more 
examples of state legislation allowing prosecution for migration-related offenses, see Juliet P. 
Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1557, 1599 n.224 (2008). 
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local governments to focus on immigrant populations for 
prosecution.51 
Not only are immigration prosecutions on the rise, but, as 
previously noted, the collateral immigration consequences of 
noncitizens’ criminal convictions have also become increasingly 
punitive.52 Over the past two decades, Congress has passed a number 
of provisions that require or permit deportation as a collateral 
consequence of a growing number of criminal convictions.53 Thus, 
once an individual has been convicted of certain types of criminal 
offenses, those criminal convictions become the basis for their 
expulsion from the country in civil removal proceedings. 
The collateral sanction of removal now applies in a broad array 
of criminal cases. For example, the law currently requires that any 
noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony be deported, regardless 
of the equities of his case.54 For over two decades, the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) had specified that noncitizens convicted of 
aggravated felonies were deportable.55 Two laws passed in 1996—the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA)56 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA)57—changed the operation of this provision in draconian 
 
 51. See Valerie Fernández, Profiling Persists Despite Revamped Guidelines, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, July 30, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.org/news.asp?idnews=47894 (relaying the argument 
of Aarti Shahani, Researcher, Justice Strategies, that Arizona officials do not need federal 
government contracts to enforce immigration law because the Arizona code provides such 
broad tools to law enforcement). See generally Chacón, supra note 10 (documenting a 
simultaneous increase in immigration prosecutions and an erosion of criminal protections for 
immigration defendants). 
 52. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control 
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1844 (2007) (noting a number of increasingly 
punitive penalties relating to immigration); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2087–88 (2008) (explaining the severity of the proposed 
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act). See generally 
Kanstroom, supra note 43, at 651–52 (“[W]e live in a time of extreme ‘vigor, efficiency, and 
strictness’ as to deportation of non-citizens convicted of crimes, due to nearly two decades of 
sustained attention to this issue.” (footnote omitted)); Legomsky, supra note 43, at 482–86 
(discussing the increasingly severe immigration consequences that follow from noncitizens’ 
criminal convictions); Miller, supra note 10, at 631–39 (discussing the increasingly common 
imposition of deportation on noncitizens who commit certain kinds of criminal offenses). 
 53. Chacón, supra note 52, at 1844; Legomsky, supra note 43, at 471. 
 54. INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226.1 (2006). 
 55. Id. 
 56. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
 57. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.). 
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ways. Not only did these laws greatly expand the definition of 
“aggravated felonies,”58 but IIRIRA also eliminated the ability of an 
immigration judge to provide relief from deportation in cases in 
which the equities favored that relief.59 Congress also added to the list 
of offenses other than aggravated felonies that render a noncitizen 
deportable or excludable. For example, Congress mandated that even 
very minor drug crimes are grounds for exclusion and deportation, 
and has provided almost no relief for lawful permanent residents or 
unauthorized migrants charged under these provisions.60 The 
expansion of immigration consequences for drug crimes coincided 
with the “war on drugs,”61 and the harshness of the resulting legal 
regime has been the subject of sustained scholarly criticism.62 
Finally, even when no criminal charges are at stake, the 
administrative measures that the government employs to achieve civil 
immigration goals increasingly resemble criminal punishment. ICE 
agents conduct militarized raids in both criminal and civil matters.63 
DHS also imposes protracted detentions, sometimes under very harsh 
conditions, upon many migrants (including refugees) who are either 
attempting to establish their admissibility or contesting their 
 
 58. Chacón, supra note 52, at 1827. For the complete definition of “aggravated felony,” see 
INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
 59. Chacón, supra note 52, at 1845; see also BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: 
VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 54–58 (2006) (discussing the severity of 
immigration law and associated punishments). See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding 
the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000) (discussing the changes to the law and critiquing reform proposals). 
 60. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h); see also Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Drug 
Inadmissibility, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 166–67 (2008) (discussing the broad scope of the 
drug inadmissibility provision and the limited nature of waiver); Jeff Yates, Todd A. Collins & 
Gabriel J. Chin, A War on Drugs or a War on Immigrants? Expanding the Definition of “Drug 
Trafficking” in Determining Aggravated Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 MD. L. REV. 875, 878–
79 (2005) (highlighting certain inequities of the sentencing system as it currently stands). 
 61. See Yates et al., supra note 60, at 876 (suggesting a strong causality between the war on 
drugs and the severity of immigration law on drug offenses); see also Morawetz, supra note 60, 
at 166–67 (commenting on the “zero tolerance” policy on inadmissibility over even the most 
minor of offenses). 
 62. See, e.g., Morawetz, supra note 60; Yates et al., supra note 60. 
 63. CHIU ET AL., supra note 34, at 1 (“[ICE] home raids generally involve teams of heavily 
armed ICE agents making predawn tactical entries into homes, purportedly to apprehend some 
high priority target believed to be residing therein. ICE has admitted that these are warrantless 
raids and, therefore, that any entries into homes require the informed consent of residents. 
However, frequent accounts in the media and in legal filings have told a similar story of 
constitutional violations occurring during ICE home raids—a story that includes ICE agents 
breaking into homes and seizing all occupants without legal basis.”); NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE 
MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 35. 
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deportability.64 Indeed, immigration detention facilities now 
constitute the fastest-growing segment of the prison industry.65 Over 
the past decade, bed space in immigration detention facilities has 
risen from just over 8,000 beds in 1996 to 27,500 in 2006.66 “By the end 
of 2009, the U.S. government will have more than 440,000 people in 
immigration custody” annually—three times the number of a decade 
ago.67 Immigrants who are awaiting the completion—and in some 
cases, the initiation68—of their civil removal proceedings are often 
housed in the same facilities as criminal offenders and are treated 
much like criminal detainees.69 This is true even though most lack any 
criminal record whatsoever, and a significant number of those who do 
have criminal records are guilty of the migration-related offenses of 
entry without inspection or felony reentry.70 
 
 64. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants 
Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 
551–52 (2009) (providing a case study about the barriers to litigating immigration claims from an 
immigration detention facility); Nina Bernstein, For a Mentally Ill Immigrant, a Path Clears Out 
of the Dark Maze of Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at A20 (detailing the harsh 
conditions in immigration detention for a mentally ill detainee); Nina Bernstein, Officials 
Obscured Truth of Migrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at A1 (discussing 
numerous immigrant deaths in detention and the agency cover-up of the details of these 
deaths). 
 65. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/ 
immigration-detention-overview-and-recommendations; see also Nina Bernstein, Report Critical 
of Scope and Cost of Immigration Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A17 (highlighting the 
significant and potentially wasteful costs associated with current detention facilities). 
 66. Compare U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FY2002 BUDGET SUMMARY 114 (2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/2002summary/pdf/ins_breached_bond.pdf (providing 1996 
data), with U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
OFFICE OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL: KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2006), 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/dro110206.htm (providing 2006 data). 
 67. Jared Polis, The Case for Detention Reform, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 15, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jared-polis/case-for-detention-reform_b_287260.html. This is 
also double the number that the American Bar Association reported to be detained in 2004. 
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, IMMIGRATION DETAINEE PRO BONO OPPORTUNITIES 
GUIDE 1 (2004), available at http:// www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/probonoguidefinal. 
pdf. 
 68. DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING LIN, IMMIGRANT DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET 
ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf (noting that on a given day, 
more than half of the noncitizens in immigration detention had not received final orders of 
removal). 
 69. SCHRIRO, supra note 65, at 21–22. 
 70. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 68, at 20–21 (noting that 58 percent of the detainees had no 
criminal record, and that of those who did, the “most serious” convictions for 6 percent of them 
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These trends—the increasing prosecution of immigration crimes, 
the use of the civil removal system as an adjunct for criminal 
punishment, and the criminalization of the means and mechanisms of 
civil removal—have all contributed to the criminalization of 
immigration in the United States. One of the most interesting cultural 
repercussions of this transformation in the landscape of immigration 
enforcement is that it has substantially changed the discourse around 
unauthorized migration. As immigration control increasingly 
functions as an adjunct to crime control, the role of local law 
enforcement in immigration control has been reimagined. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, local law enforcement officials who have previously 
had very little role in immigration enforcement are now participating 
in significant immigration-control efforts.71 
The recent rise of local law enforcement participation in 
immigration enforcement demonstrates the shallowness of the fiction 
of deportation as a civil remedy distinct from criminal punishment. 
The involvement of state and local law enforcement officers in 
immigration control illustrates both that these officials understand 
immigration enforcement as an indirect means of achieving some of 
their own crime-control goals and that these officials see immigration 
violations as crime problems in and of themselves. The next Part 
explores the various ways in which state and local law enforcement 
have begun to participate in immigration enforcement efforts. 
II.  DECENTRALIZING ENFORCEMENT: THE RISE OF STATE  
AND LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN MIGRATION CONTROL 
Over the past decade, state and local police have become 
involved in a wide variety of immigration enforcement efforts. This 
relatively recent development marks a very significant transformation 
in the role of state and local police. In 1996, the Department of 
Justice issued a memorandum that outlined the limits of state and 
local authority to enforce immigration laws.72 The memorandum 
concluded that state and local officials did not have the authority to 
 
were immigration offenses, whereas the most serious convictions for another 13 percent were 
traffic violations). 
 71. Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1118–19 (2009). 
See generally Stumpf, supra note 50 (describing and theorizing the trend). 
 72. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, BACKGROUNDER: IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE 1 (2004), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/ 
images/uploads/Backgrounder-StateLocalEnforcement.pdf. 
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enforce civil immigration laws.73 Thus, a state or local police officer 
could not detain a noncitizen based on the noncitizen’s presence 
without current authorization, because that is a mere civil violation, 
not a criminal offense.74 On the other hand, if the officers had 
probable cause to make an arrest for a criminal violation of the 
immigration law, such as illegal reentry or alien smuggling, they were 
authorized to do so under their inherent law enforcement authority.75 
In 1996, Congress expanded the power of state and local law 
enforcement to enforce federal immigration law.76 First, AEDPA 
formally authorized those officers to arrest and detain unlawfully 
present noncitizens who had “previously been convicted of a felony in 
the United States.”77 Second, IIRIRA empowered the attorney 
general (now the secretary of DHS) to authorize local officials to 
enforce civil immigration laws when “an actual or imminent mass 
influx of aliens . . . presents urgent circumstances requiring an 
immediate Federal response.”78 Finally, IIRIRA added section 287(g) 
to the Immigration and Nationality Act to allow the attorney general 
to delegate immigration enforcement authority to state and local 
police pursuant to a formal agreement between the state or local 
agency and the Department of Justice, provided the state or local 
officers have undergone adequate training to enforce the immigration 
laws.79 Such agreements, now increasingly common, are often referred 
to as “287(g) agreements.” 
 
 73. Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 26, 32 (1996) (“[S]tate and local police lack recognized legal authority to stop and 
detain an alien solely on suspicion of civil deportability, as opposed to criminal violations of the 
immigration laws or other laws.”). 
 74. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRIMINALIZING UNLAWFUL 
PRESENCE: SELECTED ISSUES 2 (2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/ 
P585.pdf (“Although an alien who unlawfully enters the United States is potentially subject to 
removal and criminal prosecution, an alien found unlawfully present in the U.S. is typically 
subject only to removal.”). 
 75. See Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel at 27 (“Subject to the provisions of state law, state and local police may 
constitutionally detain or arrest aliens who have violated the criminal provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 76. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72, at 3, 5. 
 77. AEDPA, 8 U.S.C. §1252c (2006); see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72, 
at 3–4 (describing the changes in the law). 
 78. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10); see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72, at 3–4 
(describing the changes in the law); NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., SAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR 
POLICIES LIMITING THE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES 2–3 
(2004) (same). 
 79. INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g); NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72, at 2. 
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After September 11, 2001, the role of state and local law 
enforcement in enforcing immigration laws, particularly civil 
immigration laws, became increasingly murky.80 The Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) in the Justice Department under Attorney General 
John Ashcroft revised the 1996 memorandum regarding the role of 
state and local police in immigration enforcement, concluding that 
state and local law enforcement had “inherent authority” to arrest 
and detain immigration violators, including civil violators.81 But the 
OLC memo was not immediately released. Instead, then–White 
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales issued a 2002 letter to the 
Migration Policy Institute suggesting a more moderate position than 
the unconstrained “inherent authority” position taken by OLC.82 
Gonzales’s memo indicated that state and local police had authority 
“to arrest and detain persons who are in violation of immigration laws 
and whose names have been placed in the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC).”83 But even this more limited authority 
signaled a definite broadening of state and local police power, 
because the NCIC then (as now) included civil violators of the 
immigration law.84 
In the wake of this confusion, state and local police officers 
began to participate in immigration enforcement in a variety of forms. 
The remainder of this Part discusses three different forms of state and 
 
 80. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72, at 2. 
 81. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to the U.S. Att’y Gen., Regarding Non-Preemption of the Authority of State 
and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations (Apr. 3, 
2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
FORUM, supra note 72, at 5 (discussing the Justice Department’s 2002 policy change regarding 
civil violations); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 787, 801–02 (2008) (discussing the OLC memo and the varied responses taken 
by states and localities in asserting their “inherent authority”); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws 
in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws 
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 966 (2004) (same). 
 82. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G. 
Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute (June 24, 2002), available at http://www.migration 
policy.org/files/whitehouse.pdf; see also Pham, supra note 81, at 987 (discussing and contesting 
the reasoning of the letter). 
 83. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G. 
Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute, supra note 82; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
FORUM, supra note 72, at 5 (discussing the Justice Department’s 2002 inclusion of civil 
offenders in the database); Pham, supra note 81, at 987 (discussing the letter). 
 84. Cf. Kalhan, supra note 35, at 1162–63 (critiquing this development); Michael J. 
Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Law, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 
1086 (2004) (same). 
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local involvement in federal immigration enforcement.85 Section II.A 
addresses state and local cooperation pursuant to intergovernmental 
memoranda of agreement. Section II.B discusses a range of programs 
that fall under the broad umbrella of the “ICE ACCESS” programs. 
Section II.C focuses on a recently developed and expanding 
cooperation initiative known as the “Secure Communities initiative.” 
Each of these Sections provides illustrations of the ways in which 
particular forms of cooperation can lead to procedural-rights 
violations. 
A. Section 287(g) Agreements 
Among the most oft-discussed examples of state-local 
collaboration in immigration enforcement are the partnerships 
between the Department of Homeland Security and state and local 
law enforcement agencies known as “287(g) agreements.”86 Section 
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which became law in 
1996, allows for the cross-designation of certain trained state or local 
law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration law.87 As of 
December 2009, ICE had signed sixty-three memoranda of agreement 
(MOAs) with state and local law enforcement agencies.88 According 
 
 85. At the same time that states and localities are increasing their participation in the 
enforcement of federal immigration law, they are also increasing the roles of their law 
enforcement officials in policing migration by enacting immigration-related legislation at the 
state and local level. For additional discussions of this development, see Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Tensions and Tradeoffs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 81–87, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal); Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting 
Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 580–81 (2009); Pham, supra note 71, at 
1118–19 (2009); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Federal Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 582–90 (2008); Stumpf, supra note 50, at 1559–60; Rick Su, 
A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1622–24 (2008). See 
generally Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, 
Prejudice and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23 (disagreeing with 
Professor Spiro and arguing that preemption of state involvement in immigration enforcement 
is not an abrogation of state rights). 
 86. See INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). 
 87. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 to -564 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)). 
 88. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Partners, http://www.ice.gov/partners/ 
287g/Section287_g.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010); see also Senate Judiciary Committee Holds 
Hearing on Oversight of DHS, 85 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1209, 1210 (2008) (citing to the 
testimony of Secretary Chertoff that there were over forty such agreements in March 2008). The 
number of 287(g) agreements actually peaked at seventy-seven, but after Secretary Napolitano 
of the Department of Homeland Security announced reforms to the program in July 2009, the 
number of participating jurisdictions declined. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
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to ICE accounts, “[t]he program is credited for identifying more than 
70,000 (since January 2006) individuals, mostly in jails, who are 
suspected of being in the country illegally.”89 In 2006, ICE budgeted 
$6,340,000 for training expenditures related to agreements entered 
into under section 287(g).90 
These agreements embody the most transparent form of state-
local involvement in immigration enforcement. Memoranda of 
agreement govern the scope of the cooperation, and state and/or local 
officers receive training in immigration law.91 At their most expansive, 
these agreements allow designated state and local officers to act in the 
same capacity as immigration officers in enforcing immigration law.92 
Under section 287, state and local agents are empowered to act “in 
relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of 
[noncitizens] in the United States.”93 
The powers of state and local agents to enforce immigration laws 
vary depending on the scope and content of the agreement in force. 
The most common form of 287(g) agreement is also the most limited. 
This kind of agreement exists between ICE and state or county prison 
and jail officials, or “Jail Enforcement Officers” (JEOs).94 ICE trains 
these JEOs to make determinations of the immigration status of 
inmates in state and county prisons and jails, and to report 
 
Secretary Napolitano Announces New Agreements for State and Local Immigration 
Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New Agreements (July 10, 2009), available at http:/www. 
dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1247246453625.shtm. 
 89. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88. This number is significantly 
larger than the one provided to the Senate Judiciary Committee by DHS Secretary Michael 
Chertoff in March 2008, when he told the committee that more than 28,000 unauthorized 
migrants had been identified for potential removal through joint efforts under section 287(g) as 
of the spring of 2008. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Oversight of DHS, supra 
note 88, at 1210. 
 90. Letter from Reba A. McGiniss, Chief, Information Disclosure Unit, U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement, to Professor Michael Wishnie (Jan. 17, 2008) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
 91. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88. 
 92. These are the agreements designated as “Task Force Officers” agreements by ICE. Id.; 
see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND 
LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 8 (2009), available at http://www.gao. 
gov/new.items/d09109.pdf. 
 93. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006). 
 94. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88; see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 8 (describing the “jail model” of state and local 
participation). 
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immigration violators to ICE.95 Agreements of this type exist in 
various cities and counties in Arkansas, Arizona, California, Florida, 
Georgia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.96 
Other MOAs between ICE and local law enforcement are much 
broader and allow local law enforcement officers, after a specified 
training period, to enforce immigration laws directly, with the full 
immigration authority granted to ICE in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.97 There are some limitations on the officers wielding 
this power.98 Only officers who have received training are eligible to 
perform immigration enforcement duties,99 and those officers are 
subject to ICE supervision during the course of their performance of 
immigration enforcement duties.100 Generally, ICE requires that 
immigration arrests be reported to ICE within twenty-four hours.101 In 
return, state and local officials are ensured federal immunity when 
performing immigration enforcement duties pursuant to the terms of 
the agreement.102 
In spite of significant criticisms of the 287(g) program,103 on July 
10, 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that her 
department planned to expand the 287(g) program, adding eleven 
new law enforcement agencies to the list of signatories of 287(g) 
agreements.104 In response to the program’s many critics, however, 
DHS revised the MOAs to clarify the scope of immigration 
enforcement powers granted by the agreements and provided 
additional guidelines for ICE supervision of the program.105 To 
combat the concern that 287(g) agreements were serving as the basis 
for pretextual (and illegitimate) criminal arrests as a means of 
 
 95. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and 
the State of Ala. (Sept. 10, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Some participating 
agencies are designated as both JEOs and TFOs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 92, at 8. 
 98. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 7–8. 
 99. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and 
the State of Ala., supra note 97, at 2, 5. 
 100. Id. at 5. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 6. 
 103. See infra notes 278–84 and accompanying text. 
 104. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 88. 
 105. Id. 
CHACON IN FINAL.DOC 4/28/2010  5:12:36 PM 
2010] A DIVERSION OF ATTENTION? 1585 
initiating removal proceedings, the revised MOAs clarified the fact 
that law enforcement agencies are required to pursue all criminal 
charges that originally caused the offender to be taken into custody.106 
The revised MOAs also prioritize the enforcement efforts on which 
participating law enforcement agencies ought to focus, noting that the 
first priority ought to be noncitizens arrested for major drug offenses 
or violent crimes.107 
A number of civil rights organizations have concluded that the 
minor revisions to the program are unlikely to address racial-profiling 
concerns, and have also expressed a concern over the fact that the 
new MOAs specify that documents generated pursuant to these 
agreements “shall not be considered public records.”108 
Demonstrating the complete lack of middle ground in the 
immigration debate, certain civil rights organizations criticize the 
Obama administration’s reforms as completely ineffectual, while 
organizations that favor strict enforcement argue that these same 
revisions essentially gut the agreements.109 
If 287(g) agreements raise concerns, they also have certain 
virtues. First, in spite of restrictions on public access, they are 
transparent relative to other forms of cooperation, insofar as the 
technical terms of cooperation are reduced to a written document. 
ICE publicizes a list of existing agreements,110 and the public can 
obtain the agreements themselves. Second, the agreements contain 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. See, e.g., Sherry Greenfield, Federal Authorities Announce Changes to Controversial 
287g Program, GAZETTE.NET, July 21, 2009, http://www.gazette.net/stories/07212009/frednew 
74048_32538.shtml (outlining local law enforcement’s understanding of 287(g) priorities). For a 
hyperlink to a side-by-side comparison of a typical MOA before and after the changes, see id. 
 108. Daphne Eviatar, Immigration Program Expands, Despite Abuse Record: Many of 
Arpaio’s Tactics Sanctioned by Federally Granted Authority, WASH. INDEP., July 23, 2009, 
http://washingtonindependent.com/52197/immigration-program-expands-despite-abuse-record; 
see also Daphne Eviatar, New DHS Rules Disappoint Immigrants’ Advocates, WASH. INDEP., 
July 17, 2009 http://washingtonindependent.com/51662/new-dhs-rules-disappoint-immigrants-
advocates (noting the dissatisfaction of the National Immigration Law Center, the Detention 
Watch Network, and the ACLU, and reporting that “a group of 25 civil rights and community 
groups issued a statement denouncing” the expansion of the program). 
 109. See, e.g., JENA BAKER MCNEILL & MATT A. MAYER, SECTION 287(G) REVISIONS: 
TEARING DOWN STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ONE CHANGE AT A TIME 
(2009), www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/wm2543.cfm (writing that by requiring 
law enforcement to process noncitizens for crime, the revisions “gut the force-multiplier 
purpose of 287(g)”). 
 110. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88. 
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complaint procedures for reporting abuses,111 and DHS now has its 
own published procedure for complaints.112 Moreover, when the 
federal government has concerns about a particular law enforcement 
agency, the government can decline to enter into an agreement with 
that agency, or can even cancel an existing one.113 Finally, the 
agreements are limited in scope. Only trained law enforcement 
officials participate in immigration enforcement, and their powers are 
limited by written agreement. There is no doubt that 287(g) authority 
can be, and has been, subject to abuses and has suffered from 
insufficient federal oversight. Nevertheless, the agreements, entered 
into pursuant to a statutory provision, are constrained to a certain 
degree by law. As will be discussed below, not all enforcement 
cooperation is similarly constrained, and this raises an even more 
difficult set of problems than the 287(g) program. 
B. ICE ACCESS and State and Local Law Enforcement 
Although 287(g) programs have been the subject of a good deal 
of critical attention, they are a tiny part of the overall system of state 
and local participation in enforcement that has evolved over the past 
decade. Indeed, in recent months, ICE has organized a number of 
ongoing cooperative operations under the umbrella of its ACCESS 
program.114 
Examples of ACCESS programs include the Law Enforcement 
Support Center (LESC), “Fugitive Operations Teams” deployed 
throughout the country, “Operation Predator,” and “Operation 
 
 111. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Section 287g, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/ 
factsheets/section287_g.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (noting that each MOA “prescribes the 
agreed upon complaint process governing officer conduct during the life of the MOA”). Given 
the Government Accountability Office’s concerns regarding the inconsistencies of oversight 
generally, it is not clear how effective such procedures have been. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 14–15. 
 112. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcment, 287(g) Complaint Process, http://www.ice. 
gov/pi/news/factsheets/section287_g-complaints.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 113. For a discussion of the cancellation of the Maricopa County contract, see infra notes 
280–81 and accompanying text. 
 114. ACCESS stands for Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and 
Security. At the moment, it encompasses fourteen programs, although the umbrella is loose 
enough to accommodate frequent changes in enforcement efforts. See U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, Office of State and Local Coordination: Access - Agreements of 
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security, http://www.ice.gov/oslc/ 
iceaccess.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (listing ACCESS programs). This Article does not 
address all fourteen programs, but instead focuses on those most directly related to interior 
immigration enforcement. 
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Community Shield.”115 In each of these efforts, state and local law 
enforcement officers have played a role—one that has not been 
confined to the four corners of 287(g) agreements. This Section 
discusses each of these four programs in turn. 
1. From Operation Absconder and NSEERS to LESC.  In late 
2001, the Department of Justice announced that it would enter into 
NCIC the names of foreign nationals who had ignored outstanding 
deportation orders—a category of people that they labeled 
“absconders.”116 The absconder category is problematic: studies have 
shown that as many as two-thirds of the individuals categorized by 
ICE as absconders never actually received notice that they were 
subject to removal.117 Nevertheless, these names were entered into the 
database. 
In June 2002, the attorney general expanded this use of NCIC to 
include individuals who violated the terms of the National Security 
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS).118 NSEERS required 
certain noncitizens deemed to be “high risk” to submit to 
fingerprinting, photographs, and registration of their location on a 
periodic basis.119 Notably, for purposes of the NSEERS program, risk 
was a function of one’s nationality and religion.120 Individuals who 
violated the terms of the program were entered into the NCIC 
database.121 
Since that time, the Justice Department has expanded the NCIC 
database to include a host of noncitizens whose only infractions are 
violations of civil immigration law.122 Yet because the names are in the 
database, police often detain these individuals following routine 
encounters. The practice of including civil violators in NCIC has thus 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., BLURRING THE LINES: A PROFILE OF STATE AND 
LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW USING THE NATIONAL CRIME 
INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE, 2002–2004, at 7 (2005), available at http://www.migration 
policy.org/pubs/MPI_report_Blurring_the_Lines_120805.pdf. 
 117. Id. at 6. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of 
Post-9/11 Policy Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction 
Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 609, 630 (2005). 
 120. See id. (discussing the NSEERS program’s targeting of those originating from Arabian 
or Muslim countries, regardless of what passport they held). 
 121. Wishnie, supra note 84, at 1096. 
 122. Id. at 1086–87. 
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resulted in a de facto (and sometimes unwitting) cooperation of state 
and local law enforcement with DHS in enforcing civil immigration 
laws—a fact that incited criticisms by some local officials.123 
Regardless of potential criticism, the entry of immigration 
violators, including civil violators, into the NCIC has by now become 
a routine practice. The NCIC database now contains over 250,000 
ICE records.124 Currently, ICE agents train state and local law 
enforcement officers to use ICE’s Law Enforcement Support Center, 
which provides officers with the ability to inquire about a person’s 
criminal history and immigration history.125 Upon a call from a state 
or local law enforcement officer, an ICE officer runs the individual’s 
identification data through various DHS databases and the NCIC 
database to ascertain immigration status.126 Increasingly, localities are 
taking advantage of this training so that individuals detained during 
routine traffic stops or other minor violations must be cleared 
through LESC. Despite concerns about the accuracy of these 
databases, the number of calls to the LESC database was over 
800,000 in the year 2008, up from 4,000 in 1996.127 From somewhat 
narrow beginnings, the practice of entering absconders into the NCIC 
database has resulted in what effectively amounts to robust 
cooperation between ICE and state and local law enforcement 
officers in enforcing not only criminal law, but also civil immigration 
law. 
2. Fugitive Operations Teams.  Another development arising out 
of Operation Absconder was ICE’s formation of Fugitive Operations 
Teams throughout the country. ICE initiated the National Fugitive 
Operations Program on February 25, 2002, within the Office of 
 
 123. See, e.g., IMMIGRATION COMM., MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS, M.C.C. IMMIGRATION 
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY LOCAL 
POLICE AGENCIES 10 (2006), available at http://majorcitieschiefs.org/pdfpublic/mcc_position_ 
statement_revised_cef.pdf (“The inclusion of civil detainers on the system has created confusion 
for local police agencies and subjected them to possible liability for exceeding their authority by 
arresting a person upon the basis of a mere civil detainer.”); see also APPLESEED, FORCING 
OUR BLUES INTO GRAY AREAS: LOCAL POLICE AND FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
28–29 (2008), available at http://www.neappleseed.org/docs/local_police_and_immigration_ 
enforcement.pdf (discussing this criticism). 
 124. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Law Enforcement Support Center, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/lesc.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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Detention and Removal.128 The stated purpose of these teams is to 
“identify, locate, apprehend, process, and remove fugitive aliens from 
the United States, with the highest priority placed on those fugitives 
who have been convicted of crimes.”129 ICE has grouped its Fugitive 
Operations efforts, along with the 287(g) agreements, the LESC 
program, and several other programs, under the umbrella of its 
ACCESS program.130 The Fugitive Operations program has rapidly 
expanded over the past five years. In 2003, at its inception, the 
program consisted of eight teams131 and a $9 million budget.132 By 
October 2008, there were one hundred teams and a $218 million 
budget.133 
Even with a significant increase in staffing, ICE’s Fugitive 
Operations Teams still rely on other law enforcement agencies to 
help them achieve their stated goals. Indeed, ICE actively solicits 
cooperation from state and local law enforcement to participate as 
liaisons to their Fugitive Operations efforts.134 These state and local 
agents have conducted activities in connection with ICE’s Fugitive 
Operations program in many different parts of the country.135 State 
and local officials who participate in these operations—unlike those 
who enforce immigration laws pursuant to 287(g) agreements—need 
not undergo lengthy training. Interviews with various law 
enforcement agencies have revealed that participation in this program 
 
 128. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, National Fugitive Operations Program, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/nfop.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 129. ICE ACCESS, supra note 7. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Jessica Schau, Amidst Critical Reports, Obama Administration to Review Home Raids 
Program, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 251, 252 (2008) (citing Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., Remarks on the State of Immigration and the No Match Rule (Oct. 23, 2008), 
available at http:// www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1224803933474.shtm). 
 132. Id. at 252 (citing OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
AN ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S 
FUGITIVE OPERATIONS TEAMS 6 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/ 
OIG_07-34_Mar07.pdf). 
 133. Id. (citing Chertoff, supra note 131). 
 134. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 128; see also OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 132, at 24 (describing state and local participation in these efforts). 
 135. See, e.g., Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, 644 F. 
Supp. 2d 1177, 1185–89, 1203–04 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (describing, inter alia, local police 
involvement in immigration enforcement and ruling on civil rights violations by local and 
federal officials); Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, Nassau Complains to U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at B1 (noting the participation of the Nassau County Police in area ICE 
raids and recording a local officer’s dissatisfaction with the way the raid was conducted). 
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sometimes requires no training at all.136 Moreover, unlike 287(g) 
programs, Fugitive Operations does not impose a formal reporting or 
supervision structure on state and local participants. Presumably, this 
is justified on the ground that ICE agents are responsible for actual 
arrests and interrogations, whereas state and local officers are limited 
to providing information to ICE about suspects and playing a 
supporting role for ICE during enforcement actions.137 
The Fugitive Operations Teams’ stated objective of 
apprehending “fugitives who have been convicted of crimes,”138 
overlaps with state and local public safety responsibilities, which may 
explain the participation of untrained state and local officers in these 
efforts. The search for “fugitives,” however, often yields arrests of 
many noncitizens who were not the subject of the initial search. When 
ICE has an administrative warrant to search for a fugitive, this 
warrant is often used to secure entry into homes or other private 
areas where it is possible to sweep up “collateral catches.”139 Until 
 
 136. Interview with Carolyn Hsu, Pub. Relations Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, in Dallas, Tex. (Sept. 16, 2008) (stating that no additional training is required for 
local law enforcement to participate on Fugitive Operations Teams, while noting the limited 
role of local police in enforcement actions); Interview with Marshals from the Joint E. Tex. 
Fugitive Apprehension Task Force, Sherman, Tex., and the Gulf Coast Violent Offenders Task 
Force, S. Dist. of Tex. (Sept. 16, 2008) (same). These interviews have been memorialized in a 
document on file with the Duke Law Journal. Indeed, not all federal agent participants received 
special training prior to their involvement in these programs. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., supra note 132, at 29–30. 
 137. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 132, at 26–29. Police engage in 
activities such as securing the perimeter of homes during ICE raids. Id. at 27. Presumably, this 
implies that they are authorized to use force against civil immigration violators as necessary to 
“secure” the area, although there is no available information about whether or how often this 
has actually happened. Interestingly, DHS’s Office of the Inspector General report suggests that 
the role of state and local law enforcement officers at the scene of enforcement activities is to 
“ease[] the[] concerns” of the subjects of the enforcement action who would otherwise be 
“afraid of the [immigration] officers in plainclothes,” id. at 27, although it is a bit hard to fathom 
how adding armed police officers into the raid equation would do anything other than escalate 
the concerns of the targets. 
 138. Id. at 4. 
 139. Nina Bernstein, Despite Vow, Target of Immigrant Raids Shifted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2009, at A1; Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Priorities Questioned: Report Says Focus on Deporting 
Criminals Apparently Shifted, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2009, at A2; see also CHIU ET AL., supra note 
34, at 11 (“[T]he high percentage of collateral arrests is consistent with allegations that ICE 
agents are using home raids for purported targets as a pretext to enter homes and illegally seize 
mere civil immigration violators . . . . who ICE happens to encounter during home raid 
operations.”); MARGOT MENDELSON, SHAYNA STROM & MICHAEL WISHNIE, MIGRATION 
POLICY INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS 
PROGRAM 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NFOP_Feb09.pdf 
(“Despite NFOP’s mandate to arrest dangerous fugitives, almost three-quarters (73 percent) of 
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recently, the majority of the people Fugitive Operations Teams 
detained had no violent criminal record, and a substantial number 
were, in fact, “collateral catches” who did not even have outstanding 
removal orders against them.140 This means that state and local law 
enforcement officers have assisted in the enforcement of civil 
immigration laws through their participation in these Fugitive 
Operations Teams. 
In a break from the practices of the prior administration, 
Secretary Napolitano of DHS ordered a review of the program in 
early 2009,141 and near the end of 2009, the Department announced 
that the Fugitive Operations Teams were to focus on their intended 
targets.142 To promote this goal, ICE required that the teams identify 
the number of arrestees who are actually fugitives (as opposed to 
collateral catches) and removed the prior administration’s quota 
requirements, which had helped to fuel more aggressive operations. 
To deal with allegations of constitutional violations by Fugitive 
Operations Teams,143 ICE officials mandated Fourth Amendment 
training for team officers every six months.144 The overall impact of 
 
the individuals apprehended by FOTs from 2003 through February 2008 had no criminal 
conviction.”). 
 140. See MENDELSON ET AL., supra note 139, at 1–2 (noting that between 2003 and 2008, 73 
percent of individuals detained by the Fugitive Operations Teams had no criminal records and 
in 2007, 40 percent of detainees were non-fugitive, “collateral catches”); Katherine Evans, The 
Ice Storm in U.S. Homes: An Urgent Call for Policy Change, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
561, 574 n.92 (2009) (“Note that of the arrests that do fall within one of the five priority 
categories, the vast majority falls within the lowest category—those individuals who have 
received an order of deportation but have no criminal history. This category, in addition to the 
collateral arrests, accounts for seventy-three percent of the nearly 97,000 arrests by Fugitive 
Operations Teams from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2008.”); see also Lee Rood, Register 
Exclusive: Many ICE Arrests Are Not of Criminals, Data Show, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 16, 
2009, at A1 (noting that in 2009 in a five-state region including Iowa, 42 percent of the arrestees 
of the Fugitive Operations Team were actually “non-fugitives” with no outstanding removal 
orders against them, and only 36 percent of arrestees actually had criminal convictions). 
 141. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Issues Immigration 
and Border Security Action Directive (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/ 
releases/pr_1233353528835.shtm. See generally Schau, supra note 131 (discussing the political 
and social developments leading up to the issuance of the Immigration and Border Security 
Action Directive). 
 142. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
Field Office Directors and Fugitive Operation Team Members, U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/partners/opp/final_fug_ 
ops_priorities12-08-09.pdf. 
 143. For a discussion of successful suppression motions brought in response to 
unconstitutional searches and seizures by ICE Fugitive Operations Teams, see infra note 236. 
 144. Memorandum from John Morton to Field Office Directors and Fugitive Operation 
Team Members, supra note 142. 
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the stated policy changes is still unclear, however. Raids on homes 
have continued under the new administration,145 and the Fourth 
Amendment training that is now required for ICE agents does not 
extend to state and local participants.146 
3. Criminal Alien Program.  Like the Fugitive Operations Teams, 
the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) involves intergovernmental 
cooperation aimed at a particular subset of immigration violators. 
Whereas the Joint Fugitive Task Forces take aim at individuals with 
outstanding orders of removal, CAP focuses on a different subset of 
immigration violators: individuals that ICE identifies as criminal 
aliens. ICE’s stated goal for CAP is to identify “criminal aliens 
incarcerated in federal, state and local prisons and jails throughout 
the United States, preventing their release into the general public by 
securing a final order of removal prior to the termination of their 
sentences.”147 Under CAP, ICE screens local arrestees in detention 
and issues detainers against removable noncitizens.148 
In theory, CAP programs should have no impact on the nature of 
state and local policing. ICE screens individuals who have already 
been arrested to determine their immigration status. The commission 
of a criminal offense, therefore, should operate as a necessary 
predicate to the ICE screening. In practice, however, participating in 
CAP can influence police behavior. Because all arrestees are 
screened, not just those convicted, the CAP program covers 
individuals who are not actually criminals. To the extent that local 
police officers view immigration enforcement as a legitimate law 
enforcement priority, they can use their discretion to target for arrest 
those whom they believe—whether correctly or incorrectly—to be 
unlawfully present. Without proper training, such incentives can lead 
some law enforcement officials to engage in racial profiling. Indeed, a 
 
 145. See Julia Preston, Firm Stance on Illegal Immigrants Remains Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
3, 2009, at A14 (“After early pledges by President Obama that he would moderate the Bush 
administration’s tough policy on immigration enforcement, his administration is pursuing an 
aggressive strategy for an illegal-immigration crackdown that relies significantly on programs 
started by his predecessor.”). 
 146. See Memorandum from John Morton to Field Office Directors and Fugitive Operation 
Team Members, supra note 142 (not specifying training or guidelines for state and local law 
enforcement officers). 
 147. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Criminal Alien Program, http://www.ice. 
gov/pi/news/factsheets/criminal_alien_program.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
 148. Id. 
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recent study of one CAP program in Irving, Texas, concluded that 
this is exactly what was happening in that town.149 
The discretion allowed to state and local law enforcement has 
increased over the life of CAP. The Obama administration has 
announced plans to expand CAP with a new initiative called “Secure 
Communities” that is also premised on intergovernmental 
cooperation to target immigration offenders with criminal records.150 
4. Operation Community Shield and Operation Predator. 
Operation Community Shield provides another example of a program 
of state-local cooperation with ICE that falls under the umbrella of 
ICE’s ACCESS programs. The stated goal of Operation Community 
Shield is to target criminal street gang members and their associates 
for deportation.151 This is not primarily an immigration enforcement 
goal, but rather a criminal law enforcement goal.152 The program is 
designed to promote coordination between state and local law 
enforcement officers and ICE in efforts to decrease gang-related 
crime and remove noncitizens who are involved in criminal gang 
activity.153 The implementation of Operation Community Shield has 
been less clear-cut than the stated goals, however. 
One of the biggest ambiguities about the operation is that it 
provides no legal definitions for “criminal street gangs” or 
“associates,” the targets of the operation.154 Identification of the 
targets thus often falls to state and local law enforcement.155 Once 
these agents identify an individual as a gang member and arrest him, 
ICE can initiate removal proceedings against that individual and any 
arrested associates on the basis of their violation of immigration 
law.156 The lack of legal standards governing the identification of gang 
 
 149. TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN 
THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ 
policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf. 
 150. Rood, supra note 140. For additional discussion of the Secure Communities initiative, 
see infra Part II.C. 
 151. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Operation Community Shield: Targeting 
Violent Transnational Street Gangs, http://www.ice.gov/pi/investigations/comshield/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 152. Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield? Examining the Removal of the 
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 321–24. 
 153. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 151. 
 154. Chacón, supra note 152, at 330–33. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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members creates a risk of increased racial profiling in law 
enforcement.157 At a minimum, it ensures that state and local law 
enforcement can be responsible for leading efforts to enforce civil 
immigration laws against identified gang members and the associates 
of gang members, even though some of these individuals have no 
criminal record, and, in the case of associates, perhaps no actual gang 
affiliation.158 
Operation Predator takes aim at one of the most reviled 
categories of criminals: sex offenders.159 Generally, the targets of 
Operation Predator are identified through the use of the FBI’s NCIC 
database of sex offenders from all fifty states.160 ICE can determine 
which of these individuals may be subject to removal, and can target 
those individuals for apprehension.161 Because the sex offender 
database includes not only serious sex offenders, but also individuals 
who have committed relatively minor offenses and individuals who 
clearly pose no risk to the greater community, however, Operation 
Predator can result in the targeting of individuals whose 
circumstances do not seem to align with DHS’s and ICE’s stated goal 
of “protecting children.”162 
 
 157. Id. at 337–44. 
 158. Questions have also been raised regarding the efficacy of using removal as an antigang 
strategy. There is no doubt that the policy is tremendously burdensome for receiving countries. 
Id. at 349–50; see also GEOFF THALE & ELSA FALKENBURGER, YOUTH GANGS IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA: ISSUES IN HUMAN RIGHTS, EFFECTIVE POLICING AND PREVENTION, A 
WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA SPECIAL REPORT 1–2 (2006), available at 
http://www.wola.org/gangs/gangs_report_final_nov_06.pdf. Moreover, there is some evidence 
suggesting that U.S. removal policy has actually strengthened the transnational ties of gang 
members and has fueled rather than diminished the gang problem. See, e.g., Rocky Delgadillo, 
Going Global to Fight Gangs, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2008, at A15 (noting that “[t]he two fastest-
growing and most powerful gangs in the world are home grown products of Los Angeles,” and 
explaining how past U.S. deportation policy helped make them into powerful transnational 
criminal elements); Matthew Quirk, How to Grow a Gang, ATLANTIC, May 2008, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200805/world-in-numbers (“For hard-core gang members, 
quickie deportations on immigration charges are often no more than short-term fixes; lengthy 
American prison sentences would be more effective.”). 
 159. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Operation Predator (July 9, 
2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0210.shtm; U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Fact Sheet - Operation Predator, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/070607operationpredator.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 160. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 159. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Terrorism as a War on 
Immigrant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 573 (2004) (“Even 
though the sex offenders have been styled as ‘the worst of the worst,’ as a consequence of their 
convictions for a sex offense, many of them were not sentenced to prison but rather to 
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Operation Predator also includes efforts to identify and assist 
children worldwide who are subject to exploitation by the child 
pornography industry; DHS makes the understandable claim that the 
initiative “protect[s] children worldwide.”163 But there is also a certain 
irony to this claim, given that the removal of persons identified as 
“sexual predators” does not seem like the best way to protect 
children in receiving countries. 
C. Secure Communities Initiative 
Another formal program involving state and local participation 
in immigration enforcement—one that is not grouped under the ICE 
ACCESS rubric—is the Secure Communities initiative. In December 
2007, President Bush signed into law the fiscal year 2008 
appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security, which 
included funds for the beginning of the Secure Communities Program 
Management Office.164 By March 2008, DHS had submitted to 
Congress a report on the program entitled Secure Communities: A 
Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens.165 The 
program initially focused on removable noncitizens in prisons and 
jails. State and local officials were charged with identifying removable 
individuals in their prisons and jails by running fingerprint data not 
only against the FBI’s criminal databases but also against DHS’s 
databases, which include information on immigration violations. DHS 
soon was directed by Congress to expand the program to include all 
 
probation, presumably an indicator of the lesser seriousness of their offense. Those sentenced to 
prison are often moved directly from prison to immigration custody. This explains why most of 
those caught through Operation Predator either had relatively old convictions or had not been 
sentenced to imprisonment.”) For example, Operation Predator targeted a 25-year-old Mexican 
national due to a statutory rape charge “that stemmed from his relationship with a 14-year-old 
girlfriend that began when he was 17 and in high school.” Frank James, Immigrant Sex 
Offenders Targeted, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2005, at 1. He was convicted, served his time in prison, 
and fulfilled his probation requirements, but was still targeted by Operation Predator. Id. 
 163. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 159. 
 164. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities, http://www.ice.gov/ 
secure_communities/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010); see also U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove 
Criminal Aliens, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/secure_communities.htm (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2010) (describing the general mission of the Secure Communities initiative). 
 165. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Unveils Sweeping New 
Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide (Mar. 28, 2008), 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/ 080414washington.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 
2010). 
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“deportable criminal aliens.”166 ICE describes the program as a “risk 
based approach” that “prioritiz[es] the removal of the most 
dangerous criminals.”167 In its current form, however, the program 
results in screening of arrestees in participating jurisdictions without 
regard for the reason for the arrest or whether the person is guilty or 
innocent of a crime.168 In this sense, ICE’s characterization of this 
program as focused exclusively on criminal aliens is somewhat 
misleading. 
The precise contours of the program are difficult to assess 
because the agencies responsible have promulgated no regulations 
governing the Secure Communities program.169 What is clear, though, 
is that the program affects a significant number of people. By 
November 2009, ninety-five cities and counties in eleven states were 
participating in the program.170 In the first half of 2009, over 266,000 
fingerprints were run through the system, resulting in 32,000 
matches.171 Not all of those individuals are necessarily removable—as 
critics point out, the net sweeps a bit widely. For example, lawful 
permanent residents who commit many types of misdemeanors are 
not removable, but they would come up as matches in this system.172 
Similarly, individuals who have been erroneously arrested but are in 
the DHS database would also come up as a match. The width of the 
Secure Community net has prompted many critics to argue that the 
program is simply not adequately tailored to achieve its purported 
objective of focusing resources on noncitizens who actually pose a 
threat to society.173 Officials defending the program emphasize the 
 
 166. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for 2010: Priorities Enforcing 
Immigration Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. of the H. Appropriations 
Comm., 111th Cong. 946 (2009) (statement of David Venturella, Executive Director, Secure 
Communities, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement). 
 167. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
SECURE COMMUNITIES FACT SHEET (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/ 
factsheets/secure_communities.pdf. 
 168. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS ABOUT THE 
SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/ 
LocalLaw/secure-communities-2009-03-23.pdf. 
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. Editorial, Immigrants, Criminalized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A38. 
 171. Susan Carroll, ICE Program Is Casting a Wide Net, HOUSTON CHRON., July 13, 2009, at 
A1 
 172. Id. On the other hand, the system also misses individuals who entered without 
inspection and are therefore not included in DHS’s records. Id. 
 173. Id.; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 168, at 3 (citing studies finding 
that ICE “has done a bad job of focusing enforcement on the ‘worst of the worst,’” and that the 
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fact that even when there are matches, ICE can ultimately exercise 
discretion in deciding whom to remove.174 
ICE plans a significant, rapid expansion of the program. By 2012, 
the program will be running in all of the nation’s prisons and 3,100 of 
its local jails.175 It is possible that the Secure Community agreements 
will obviate the need for those 287(g) agreements that focus solely on 
immigration enforcement in prisons and jails.176 
* * * 
Federal-state-local cooperation in immigration enforcement runs 
the gamut from ICE’s formal training of state and local officers in the 
enforcement of immigration laws to screening of noncitizens in local 
jails to state and local law enforcement participation in ICE arrests of 
purported street gang members or sexual predators. This summary of 
cooperation does not even take into account the more informal 
coordination between ICE and local agents in enforcement actions 
such as workplace and home raids177 and other law enforcement 
efforts in jurisdictions across the country.178 
 
“programs largely target those accused of immigration status violations and traffic offenses”); 
Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, ICE to Expand New Immigration Enforcement Program in 
Local Jails, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, June 15, 2009, http://www.migrationin 
formation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=732 (noting that the ICE guidelines fail to prioritize 
removal of those offenders who pose the greatest risks of harm to society). 
 174. Carroll, supra note 171. 
 175. Chishti & Bergeron, supra note 173. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Worksite enforcement was relatively lax in the twenty-year period that followed the 
prohibition on hiring unauthorized noncitizens. See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the 
Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 
209–11 (noting that enforcement declined throughout the 1990s and explaining reasons for the 
decline). Over the past few years, as the staffing and budget of ICE has grown, the Department 
of Homeland Security has increased the focus on worksite enforcement. See Impacts of Border 
Security and Immigration on Ways and Means Programs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 109th Cong. 12 (2006) (statement of Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement) (noting that worksite enforcement is now a “top priority” for the 
Department and the administration); Michael Chertoff, Myth vs. Fact: Worksite Enforcement, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT HOMELAND SECURITY LEADERSHIP J., July 9, 2008, http://www.dhs. 
gov/journal/leadership/2008/07/myth-vs-fact-worksite-enforcement.html (noting the increasing 
numbers of worksite raids and arrests since 2004). ICE maintains that coordination with state 
and local law enforcement is a central component of its worksite enforcement strategy. See 
Chertoff, supra (“When ICE conducts an enforcement action, it coordinates with state and local 
law enforcement and those responsible for public safety in a manner that will not compromise 
the operation.”). State and local officials are credited with participation in a number of such 
raids in dozens of jurisdictions over the past year. See, e.g., ICE Conducts Raids on Pilgrim’s 
Pride Plants in Five States; Arrests 311 Foreign Nationals, 85 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1292, 
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Despite broad scholarly claims concerning the effect of local 
participation on immigration enforcement, it should be evident from 
the foregoing discussion that the forms of cooperation are many and 
various. Different modes of cooperation raise different kinds of risks. 
In recent months, a growing number of scholars and commentators 
have focused on the pitfalls of intergovernmental cooperation 
pursuant to 287(g) agreements.179 But as the foregoing discussion 
illustrates, a great deal more intergovernmental cooperation is also 
taking place through the use of shared databases and both formal and 
ad hoc state and local law enforcement participation in ICE 
enforcement actions. All modes of cooperation that directly engage 
state and local officers in civil immigration enforcement—whether 
through 287(g) agreements, CAP, the anticrime operations discussed 
previously, or the new and expanding Secure Communities 
initiative—can fundamentally alter the procedural baselines 
governing the conduct of state and local law enforcement. 
III.  THE PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF A DECENTRALIZED, 
CRIME-CONTROL APPROACH TO MIGRATION 
The decision by officials at all levels of government to more 
actively enforce immigration law in the interior of the country is 
having a transformative effect on the nature of law enforcement in 
many parts of the United States. As previously noted, there has been 
an exponential expansion in the resources expended by the United 
States government on interior enforcement.180 If the noncitizen 
population against whom these measures are aimed were relatively 
small, such measures would be unlikely to have a widespread impact 
on national law enforcement. But the absolute numbers of 
noncitizens living and working within the United States, and 
therefore potentially subject to removal for violation of the 
immigration laws, is substantial and growing. According to census 
figures, there are now 38 million non–native born persons living in the 
 
1292 (2008) (noting that investigations were a product of multi-agency, state-federal 
cooperation and that ninety-one of those individuals faced criminal charges for identity theft 
and fraud). 
 178. Such cooperation has also occurred in antismuggling and antitrafficking enforcement 
efforts. See, e.g., Noteworthy: ICE Arrests More than 600 Illegal Aliens in Phoenix, 85 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 883, 883–84 (2008); Noteworthy: More than 300 Immigrants and 
Suspected Smugglers Arrested in Mississippi, 85 INTERPRETER RELEASES 278, 278 (2008). 
 179. See infra notes 278–84. 
 180. See supra Part I.A. 
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United States.181 Of those, more than 22 million are not naturalized 
citizens and remain subject to removal.182 According to the Pew 
Hispanic Center, this number includes about 11.5 to 12 million 
unauthorized migrants.183 
Moreover, it is important to stress that immigration enforcement 
does not affect only noncitizens. Increasingly, immigrants live in 
mixed-status families that include lawful immigrants and 
unauthorized migrants as well as citizens.184 Because noncitizens and 
citizens share homes and neighborhoods, citizens and noncitizens who 
are lawfully present are subjected to enforcement actions as a 
collateral consequence of internal immigration enforcement measures 
taken against removable noncitizens. Citizens and lawfully present 
noncitizens already have been subject to immigration enforcement 
actions, including prolonged stops, searches, interrogations, arrest, 
detention, and (in rare cases) even removal.185 
 
 181. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases 2008 American 
Community Survey Data (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/ 
www/releases/archives/american_community_survey_acs/014237.html. 
 182. Id. Indeed, changes in the law over the past two decades have rendered lawful 
permanent residents much more vulnerable to removal than in the past. See, e.g., HING, supra 
note 59, at 70–87 (2006) (discussing the removal of lawful permanent residents after the 1996 
elimination of INA § 212(c) relief); KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 227–28 (discussing the 
increasing legal vulnerability of LPRs); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE 
LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006) (describing 
the shift and advocating a return to treating lawful permanent residents as “citizens in waiting”); 
Morawetz, supra note 59, at 1953–54 (providing examples of lawful permanent residents 
removed despite substantial family ties). See generally Morawetz, supra note 60, 180–92 
(discussing the harsh immigration consequences for drug crimes committed by lawful 
permanent residents). 
 183. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 2 (2006), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf. 
 184. MICHAEL FIX, WENDY ZIMMERMAN & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE INTEGRATION OF 
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2001) (noting that one in every ten children 
in the United States lives in a family in which at least one family member is undocumented); see 
also Molly Hazel Sutter, Note, Mixed-Status Families and Broken Homes: The Clash Between 
the U.S. Hardship Standard in Cancellation of Removal Proceedings and International Law, 15 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 783, 806–08 (2006) (discussing the heavy restrictions on 
relief from removal for the undocumented relatives of U.S. citizens). See generally David B. 
Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165 
(2006) (discussing the plight of these mixed-status families). 
 185. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 13–41 (reporting on protracted detention and interrogation of U.S. 
citizens in several workplace raids); Nina Bernstein, Citizens Caught Up in Immigration Raid, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at B5; Kristin Collins, N.C. Native Wrongly Deported to Mexico, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 30, 2009, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/local/story/ 
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Given the growth in interior enforcement, and the increasing 
number of people—both citizens and noncitizens—whose lives are 
affected by this enforcement, it is worth asking whether the 
transformation in the enforcement landscape is also transforming the 
nature of individual rights and procedural protections. 
There is precedent for asking this question. As the “war on 
drugs” expanded in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars increasingly 
considered the question of whether enforcement actions undertaken 
as part of the drug war were impacting criminal procedural 
protections. Most (even those who supported the transformation) 
answered the question in the affirmative.186 “The warrant 
requirement, the need for particularized suspicion before stopping 
individuals on the highway, and the requirement that police knock 
and announce themselves before entering a private home, have all 
been proposed recently as necessary casualties of the war on drugs.”187 
Numerous cases handed down by the Supreme Court in the 1980s and 
1990s invoked the needs of the drug war to justify the circumscription 
of the rights of citizens subject to governmental investigation. During 
this time, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of government 
searches permissible without a warrant,188 greatly increased the scope 
 
917007.html (discussing ICE’s removal of an American citizen); Jacqueline Stevens, Deporting 
American Citizens: ICE’s Mexican-izing of Mark Lyttle, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 21, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacqueline-stevens-phd/deporting-american-citize_b_265187. 
html (“A systematic examination of thousands of individual case files for detainees in southern 
Arizona between 2006 and 2008 revealed that just over one percent were deemed U.S. citizens 
by an immigration judge. Almost all were held for more than two months.”); Jacqueline 
Stevens, Thin ICE, NATION, June 23, 2008, at 20, 20; Stephanie Francis Ward, Illegal Aliens on 
I.C.E., A.B.A. J., June 1, 2008, at 44, 47 (noting several incidents involving the wrongful 
deportation of U.S. citizens, many of whom had cognitive disabilities). 
 186. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 755–56 (2002); 
Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot Soldier”: Can the Fourth Amendment Survive the Supreme 
Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 631, 649 (2004); Omar Saleem, The Age of 
Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry 
“Stop and Frisk,” 50 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 471–75 (1997); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After 
the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2160 (2002) (“Like the war on drugs before it, the war on 
terrorism is likely to leave us with a different law of criminal procedure than we had before.”); 
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 938–41 
(1991). See generally David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the 
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271 (describing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
its application to drug cases). 
 187. Margaret Raymond, Commentary on “The Drug War,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
447, 448–49 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 188. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–37 (1991) (finding “consensual,” and 
therefore exempt from the warrant requirement, police officers’ searches of a passenger’s bags 
on a bus detained by police); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572–76 (1991) (upholding the 
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of stops and searches permissible without probable cause189 or even 
reasonable suspicion,190 watered down the “reasonable suspicion”191 
and “probable cause” standards,192 and lowered procedural 
protections at the border and at airport customs.193 
A byproduct of the loosening of checks on police investigations 
was that the nature of policing, particularly in low-income minority 
neighborhoods, was transformed.194 Police had freer rein to stop, 
aggressively question, search, and detain individuals in such 
neighborhoods. This—along with disparate sentencing regimes—
 
warrantless search of a container within a car during which there was probable cause to search 
only the container); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186–89 (1990) (upholding a warrantless 
entry based upon the consent of a third party when police incorrectly but “reasonably” believed 
that the third party possessed common authority over the premises); California v. Greenwood, 
486 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1988) (holding that a warrantless search of garbage bags for items indicative 
of narcotics use did not violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy); United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–25 (1984) (establishing a “good faith” exception to the 
exclusionary rule for warrants issued on less than probable cause); United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 705–07 (1983) (upholding the use of drug-detecting dogs to conduct a sniff 
examination of luggage without probable cause); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–85 
(1983) (approving the use of transmitters or beepers to conduct surveillance of suspects); United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823–24 (1982) (approving a warrantless search of closed containers 
inside an automobile, if officers have probable cause to search the vehicle). 
 189. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542–44 (1985) 
(allowing the sixteen-hour detention on the basis of reasonable suspicion at an international 
airport); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 686–88 (1985) (allowing a protracted 
roadside stop on the basis of “reasonable suspicion” alone); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
330–33 (1985) (allowing a full search of a student’s purse on reasonable suspicion that she had 
violated school rules); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–51 (1983) (allowing a brief 
“protective” search of a car on the basis of reasonable suspicion). 
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004) (finding that no 
reasonable suspicion was needed to detain a driver and vehicle and disassemble the gas tank of 
the vehicle at the international border); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002) (holding 
that no individualized suspicion was necessary to conduct drug tests on students engaged in 
extracurricular activities); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–55 (1990) 
(requiring no individualized suspicion for stops at DUI checkpoints); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 547, 566–67 (1976) (finding that no individualized suspicion was necessary 
for referral to a secondary inspection at a border checkpoint); cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 408 (2005) (finding that the use of a drug-detecting dog did not constitute a “search” 
requiring individualized suspicion). 
 191. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–26 (2000) (finding that flight from officers in a 
high-crime area generated the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop). 
 192. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237–38 (1983) (adopting a “totality of the circumstances” 
test for determining whether an informant’s tip is reliable for purposes of a search warrant). 
 193. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155–56; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542–
44; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566–67. 
 194. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 342–
54 (1998) (describing racial targeting of minority motorists for stops and searches); Saleem, 
supra note 186, at 453–60 (describing the modern dilution of criminal procedural protections). 
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helped to fuel the rising tide of minority youth imprisoned in 
America’s prisons and jails.195 More than one in every hundred adults 
in the United States is in prison or jail.196 African Americans are 
substantially overrepresented in this substantial number. One in nine 
African-American males between the ages of twenty and thirty-four 
is behind bars.197 Post–Civil Rights era race relations have largely 
been cast in the language of the war on crime, which, in turn, has 
resulted in a continued pattern of racial discrimination, segregation, 
and disenfranchisement.198 “[T]he war on crime transformed the social 
meaning of race in ways that make it more difficult than ever to 
resolve America’s constitutive flaw, its legacy of slavery and racial 
domination and the structural deformation of democracy that these 
legacies produced.”199 
The new focus on immigration enforcement—which appears to 
be the most recent iteration of the war on crime—deserves the same 
sort of analysis.200 The new criminal justice focus on migration is likely 
to encourage continued erosion of criminal procedural protections in 
ways that will be felt most keenly by racial minorities—in this case, 
Mexican Americans and other Latinos that are associated in the 
public mind with unauthorized migrants.201 
 
 195. See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 202–05 (2d ed. 2006); BRUCE WESTERN, 
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 35–51(2006). 
 196. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 3 (2008), 
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_ 
2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Loic Wacquant, The Place of the Prison in the New Government of Poverty, in 
AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME 23, 23–25, 27–28 (Mary Louise Frampton, Ian Haney López & 
Jonathan Simon eds., 2008). 
 199. Jonathan Simon, Ian Haney López & Mary Louise Frampton, Introduction to AFTER 
THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 198, at 3. 
 200. In theorizing the parallels, Ian Haney-López has posited that both the war on crime 
that gave rise to mass incarceration and the current criminalization of immigration can be seen 
as different forms of “governing through the fear of minority crime.” See Ian F. Haney-López, 
Post-Racial Racism: Policing Race in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) 
(manuscript at 109, 113), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418212 (“[R]acialized mass 
incarceration finds its origins . . . in racial politics. . . . [but] [o]nce institutionalized and available 
as a form of social ordering, crime control and the carceral state more generally achieved ever-
greater autonomy from race, and indeed from traditional areas of criminal justice.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 201. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 58 (2004) (“Europeans and Canadians tended to be disassociated from the 
real and imagined category of illegal alien, which facilitated their national and racial 
assimilation as white American citizens. In contrast, Mexicans emerged as the iconic illegal 
aliens. Illegal status became constitutive of a racialized Mexican identity and of Mexicans’ 
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This Part explores the procedural implications of the expanded 
and decentered use of criminal law enforcement to achieve migration 
control, with attention to the particular structures of cooperation that 
are currently in play. Part III.A analyzes the gap between a 
noncitizen’s rights in criminal proceedings and those in civil removal 
proceedings. Part III.B analyzes the gap in remedies for 
governmental misconduct in civil immigration proceedings that was 
created by the Supreme Court’s 1984 Lopez-Mendoza decision. Part 
III.C discusses the implications of these rights and remedies gaps in a 
world where local-state-federal collaboration in immigration 
enforcement has become the norm. Part III.D highlights some 
troubling trends in criminal jurisprudence that suggest that the rights 
gap experienced by noncitizens may be migrating from the civil into 
the criminal context. Part III.E concludes with some thoughts about 
the significance of these trends. 
A. The Rights Gap: Differential Procedural Protections in Civil 
Removal Proceedings 
The federal Constitution provides certain procedural protections 
for individuals subject to criminal investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment. These protections include the Fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures,202 the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination and right to due 
 
exclusion from the national community and polity.”). Modern policing practices evince 
exclusionary policing practices aimed at Latinos. See, e.g., Rights Working Group, ACLU, The 
Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States 42 (2009), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf (“In April 2008, in the most 
controversial of the neighborhood sweeps, Sheriff Arpaio saturated a small town of 
approximately 6,000 Yaqui Indians and Latinos outside of Phoenix with more than one hundred 
deputies, a volunteer posse, and a helicopter for two days, stopping residents and chasing them 
into their homes. In the end, nine undocumented immigrants were arrested. The community was 
so scarred by the event that families are still terrified to leave their homes when they see the 
Sheriff’s patrol cars.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 43 (noting “roadblocks and 
concentrations of police outside Latino-owned businesses and churches and predominately 
Latino areas” of Arkansas); id. at 48 (noting “serious allegations of racial profiling in [three 
Georgia] counties, especially in the context of traffic stops”); BORDER ACTION NETWORK, 
JUSTICE ON THE LINE: THE UNEQUAL IMPACTS OF BORDER PATROL ACTIVITIES IN ARIZONA 
BORDER COMMUNITIES 3 (2004), http://www.borderaction.org/ PDFs/justice_on_the_line.pdf 
(noting that DHS agents routinely stop many Latinos and question them about their citizenship, 
causing them to feel like outsiders in their communities). 
 202. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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process,203 the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,204 and the Eighth 
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.205 
These protections apply to citizens and noncitizens alike in criminal 
proceedings.206 These particular protections exist not only as against 
the federal government, but also against state actors by virtue of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.207 States also are 
able to set heightened standards of criminal procedural protection 
through their constitutions, statutes, and regulations, and some 
have.208 
Because state action is involved in the enforcement of 
immigration law—even civil immigration law—constitutional 
protections apply. But the protections available in civil proceedings 
have been differentiated from those protections available in criminal 
proceedings. The Supreme Court long ago decided that deportation 
was a civil remedy, not a criminal punishment.209 Thus, although the 
Constitution’s provisions apply to state officials enforcing 
immigration law, the scope of applicable rights and the remedies for 
violations of constitutional rights is much different in the civil 
immigration context than in the criminal context. 
With regard to rights, the Fourth Amendment protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures apply, but by operation of 
statute and case law, those protections are narrower in the 
 
 203. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. The right against self-incrimination is triggered upon arrest or “custodial 
interrogation.” See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). 
 204. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This requires the government 
to provide counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 344–45 (1963). 
 205. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 206. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1896) (finding noncitizens 
in criminal proceedings entitled to full constitutional criminal procedural protections and 
distinguishing the situation of noncitizens in removal proceedings). 
 207. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATIONS 14 
(2d ed. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes 
applicable to the states the various Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment provisions that apply to 
criminal investigation practices.”). 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 236 (“The order of deportation is not a punishment for 
crime.”); KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 122 (noting that Wong Wing was central to the genesis 
of a dichotomy between civil and criminal proceedings). 
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immigration enforcement context than in the criminal context.210 The 
Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination do not apply 
in civil proceedings,211 and federal regulations only call for officers to 
offer a portion of the basic requirement of the Miranda decision when 
conducting criminal arrests,212 with no comparable requirement for 
civil arrests. Limitations on extremely coercive interrogations apply in 
civil proceedings by virtue of the operation of the Due Process 
Clause,213 but these violations are much more difficult to establish 
than violations of the right against self-incrimination under 
Miranda.214 There is no constitutional right to counsel at the 
government’s expense in civil removal proceedings,215 although 
noncitizens do have a statutory right to supply counsel at their own 
expense.216 The Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
 
 210. See discussion infra notes 228–35, 243–65 and accompanying text. 
 211. The right is limited to the criminally accused. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Thus, the 
constitutional requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), whereby an individual 
subject to a custodial interrogation must be advised of her right to silence and to counsel—at the 
government expense if necessary—do not apply in the civil context. 
 212. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(v) (2009) (requiring that at the time of arrest, an “arresting 
officer shall advise the person of the appropriate rights as required by law at the time of the 
arrest, or as soon thereafter as practicable”). Of course, not every situation involving a 
“custodial interrogation” that triggers Miranda need be preceded by an official arrest. See, e.g., 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (explaining that “custody” for purposes of 
Miranda involves situations in which a reasonable person in the suspect’s position believes that 
he has been constrained in a manner akin to a formal arrest). Thus, it is not clear that this 
regulation fully captures the requirements of Miranda. 
 213. Compare Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766–67 (2003) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment’s self-incrimination provisions attach only when there is a “‘criminal case’ [which] 
at the very least requires the initiation of legal proceedings”), with Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 
279 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1960) (suppressing a coerced confession in a deportation proceeding 
on due process grounds). 
 214. Establishing a due process violation generally requires a defendant to establish that 
some form of government coercion came into play in bringing about the confession. Sleep 
deprivation, physical abuse, and certain forms of official threats can meet the test, but a 
defendant must demonstrate that the governmental conduct amounted to some form of 
impermissible coercion. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (holding that 
physical torture constituted a due process violation). In contrast, a Miranda violation is 
established when an interrogating officer fails to offer the requisite warnings or respect an 
individual’s right to remain silent and right to counsel when those rights have been invoked. See 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442. 
 215. See Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (holding that proceedings to enforce 
immigration regulations do not involve Sixth Amendment protections). 
 216. The statutory right is provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act at section 292. 
8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in any 
appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal proceedings, the 
person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the 
Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.”). 
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punishment” does not apply because “deportation is not a 
punishment for crime.”217 
Congress, in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), set 
forth the standards that are applicable in the investigation and 
prosecution of civil immigration violations. Section 287 of the INA 
establishes standards for seizures, searches, and custodial 
interrogations, and there are subtle differences that arise between the 
immigration enforcement context and general criminal investigations 
in each of these areas. 
First, the INA addresses standards for brief investigative stops. 
INA section 287 gives any authorized officer or employee of DHS the 
general power, without a warrant, to briefly interrogate noncitizens 
about their immigration status.218 The INA makes no distinction in 
this regard between internal immigration enforcement and 
enforcement at points of entry. The statute indicates that an agent can 
interrogate any person he “believes” to be an alien within the 
meaning of the act.219 In other words, the statute allows for brief 
detentions and interrogation as to status without probable cause, 
upon reasonable suspicion that the individual is committing an 
immigration violation. Because it allows interrogation of noncitizens 
upon reasonable suspicion of a civil violation, this authority is slightly 
broader than the parameters of a stop justified by reasonable 
suspicion under Fourth Amendment law as it has developed in the 
criminal context, in which such stops are (technically) limited to cases 
in which there is reasonable suspicion of a crime or a threat to officer 
safety.220 In immigration enforcement, reasonable suspicion of a civil 
violation is sufficient to justify the stop. 
Whether an individual is obliged to answer these questions is a 
different question. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of 
 
 217. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); see also Briseno v. INS, 192 
F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment is inapplicable in removal proceedings because they are civil). 
 218. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1). 
 219. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2009) (authorizing DHS employees to issue detainer 
orders for persons already in the custody of other government agencies). 
 220. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (“We merely hold today that where a 
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may 
be armed and presently dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in 
the area to conduct a carefully limited search.”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 207, at 171–90 
(discussing the contemporary parameters of a Terry stop). 
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Nevada,221 the Supreme Court concluded that a state could pass a law 
that required individuals to identify themselves at the request of law 
enforcement upon reasonable suspicion of a crime.222 After Hiibel, if a 
state passes a “stop and identify” law, an individual is required to 
answer an officer’s request that he identify himself in the course of an 
otherwise acceptable Terry stop, and that requirement—under which 
the individual must provide his name, but not supporting 
documentation—does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.223 But 
constitutional stop-and-identify laws under Hiibel are triggered by 
suspicion of criminal conduct, not civil or technical violations.224 Yet 
most immigrants’ rights groups have advised noncitizens that 
authorities enforcing immigration law can require a person to give his 
name in a state with a stop-and-identify law.225 
This position reasonably reflects the fact that courts have given 
broad authorization to law enforcement to ask questions concerning 
immigration status. As Professor Anil Kalhan has noted, “the Court 
has edged toward giving a green light to federal, state and local law 
enforcement officials to interrogate individuals concerning their 
[immigration] status in almost any context.”226 The procedural gap 
that exists between immigration-related interrogation and 
interrogation in other enforcement contexts may have a corrosive 
effect on procedural norms concerning interrogation. Indeed, this 
could help to explain the cases in which immigration officials request 
information concerning immigration status in ways that exceed their 
legal authorization.227 
 
 221. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
 222. Id. at 185. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Compare Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–53 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a Texas 
law requiring an individual, in the absence of any suspicion of wrongdoing, to provide a name 
and address to police upon request), with Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185 (affirming the requirement to 
identify oneself on reasonable criminal suspicion). 
 225. See, e.g., ACLU RACIAL JUSTICE PROGRAM ET AL., KNOW YOUR RIGHTS WHEN 
ENCOUNTERING LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/ 
kyr/kyr_english.pdf (noting that the requirement to identify oneself exists in “some states”); 
NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS AT 
HOME AND AT WORK 3 (2008), available at http://www.nilc.org/ce/nilc/imm_enfrcmt_ 
homework_rts_2008-05.pdf (noting that most states do not require persons to give their name to 
law enforcement). 
 226. Kalhan, supra note 35, at 1208. 
 227. See, e.g., CHIU ET AL., supra note 34, at 3 (noting that in many ICE home raids, 
following unlawful home entries, “agents immediately seize and interrogate all occupants, often 
in excess of their legal authority”); NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 
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Second, the INA establishes standards for arrest. The plain 
language of Section 287 allows for an immigration agent to conduct 
an arrest if the agent “has reason to believe that the alien so arrested 
is in the United States in violation of” immigration law.228 This 
language may appear to suggest a lesser standard for arrest than the 
probable cause required to conduct an arrest under criminal law. But 
courts have construed this provision to require probable cause to 
conduct arrests, finding that the “reason to believe” language requires 
the equivalent of probable cause,229 and the language of the statute 
makes clear that arrests without warrants are only permissible in 
exigent circumstances.230 Nevertheless, it is less clear that the probable 
cause standard is as exacting in administrative arrests,231 and the 
exigency requirement often seems to be taken for granted by 
enforcing agencies and reviewing courts. Again, this means that 
immigration enforcement agents may have the authority to arrest in a 
slightly broader array of circumstances than those that permit state 
and local officials to make arrests when acting in their general law 
enforcement capacity. Perhaps this is what has led some ICE officials 
 
4TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 49–51 (discussing immigration status requests that 
exceed due process bounds). 
 228. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2006). 
 229. United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 1981); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 
F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980); Lee v. INS, 590 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975); Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
accord Contreras v. United States, 672 F.2d 307, 308 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[P]laintiffs do not contest 
that the officers had probable cause to believe that plaintiffs were in the country illegally.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 230. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (allowing warrantless arrests only if the noncitizen “is 
likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest”). 
 231. With respect to administrative warrants for immigration enforcement, at least one 
court has held that “[p]robable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of 
an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be 
based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that 
‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied 
with respect to a particular (establishment).’” Blackie’s House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 
1211, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978)). But 
another court has expressly rejected this conclusion, finding that warrants of inspection used by 
the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service required traditional probable cause analysis to 
determine whether issuance of a search warrant was constitutional. Int’l Molders’ & Allied 
Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 643 F. Supp. 884, 890–91 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
Presumably, the same standard would apply to warrantless arrests in situations in which 
warrantless arrests are authorized under the statute. Moreover, even when the initial arrest is 
illegal, that illegality does not void a subsequent deportation order based on the alien’s 
admission of his status at the hearing. Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d 666, 667 (2d Cir. 1975); 
La Franca v. INS, 413 F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir. 1969); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (7th 
Cir. 1959); Medeiros v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 634, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (per curiam). 
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to make boastful—if legally incorrect—pronouncements that they do 
not need warrants to conduct arrests in homes.232 
Third, the INA establishes standards for searches. There are 
distinctions between criminal procedural practices and the 
immigration enforcement practices outlined in the implementing 
regulations for INA section 287. The law requires government 
officials to have warrants or consent before an agent can enter a 
private home or worksite.233 Although officials may use administrative 
warrants to conduct immigration enforcement actions, the law 
requires criminal warrants for purposes of gathering criminal 
evidence.234 Unfortunately, the line between immigration law and 
criminal law is sufficiently blurry that officers are sometimes relying 
on administrative warrants in situations in which criminal law 
enforcement objectives provide the central justification for the 
government’s action.235 In other cases, officials are conducting 
searches and seizures in private homes with no warrants, even though 
the law clearly requires warrants in this setting.236 And courts have 
 
 232. See Preston, supra note 34 (quoting an ICE official, “We don’t need warrants to make 
the arrests”); Ward, supra note 185, at 44 (quoting an arresting agent in Minnesota after a 
warrantless raid, who said in response to a question about warrants, “We don’t need one”). 
 233. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (2009). 
 234. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230 (1960) (cautioning that the use of the 
administrative process in criminal matters “to circumvent the latter’s legal restrictions” would 
violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
 235. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 34 (noting that raids without warrants were carried out in 
efforts to round up 1,300 “gang members” and associates). 
 236. See, e.g., In re [redacted], No. [redacted] (Immigration Ct. Hartford, Conn. June 2, 
2009) (order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to terminate removal 
proceedings), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Hartford-
Grant-1-6.2.09.pdf (suppressing the respondent’s I-213 because the information therein was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in a warrantless home raid by ICE Fugitive 
Operations Team agents); In re P., No. [redacted] (Immigration Ct. N.Y., N.Y June 25, 2008) 
(order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to terminate removal 
proceedings), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/NY-6-30-
08.pdf (suppressing evidence obtained in a warrantless home raid and in unlawful interrogations 
conducted by a Fugitive Operations Unit); In re Pineda Morales, No. [redacted] (Immigration 
Ct. N.Y., N.Y May 13, 2008) (order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress), available at 
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/NY-5-13-08.pdf (suppressing 
evidence obtained in a warrantless home raid by an ICE Fugitive Operations Team); see also 
Ward, supra note 185, at 45 (noting that at least four lawsuits had been filed in the previous year 
alleging illegal home entries by ICE). State and local law enforcement sometimes participate in 
these home raids. See Preston, supra note 34 (describing home raids in which local sheriffs 
teamed up with immigration officers to raid a Tennessee trailer park); Opinion, Raids Promise 
to Make Bad Immigration Situation Worse, TENNESSEAN, Aug. 21, 2007 (online ed., on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (describing local police participation in Maury County raids); Rene 
Romo, Suits Fault Immigration “Raid”: Groups Allege Rights Violated, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 
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declined to suppress evidence seized when ICE officers conduct 
arrests in violation of the warrant requirements imposed by the 
immigration statute.237 
Fourth, the INA establishes standards for post-arrest 
interrogations. Once an arrest has been made, procedure with regard 
to interrogations diverges depending on whether the noncitizen has 
been arrested for “civil” immigration violations or for criminal 
violations. Officials need not give Miranda warnings to civil violators, 
such as those who are present unlawfully but are charged with no 
other immigration violation,238 as the Fifth Amendment protections 
extended to individuals in situations involving “custodial 
interrogations” since Miranda v. Arizona239 do not attach in these 
“civil” proceedings.240 The INA does specify, however, that the 
individual has the right to be represented by counsel at her own 
expense.241 In spite of this purported right to counsel, numerous 
immigration attorneys have expressed frustration at their inability to 
access clients, particularly after large raids at workplaces or 
residential sites.242 
 
18, 2007, at A1 (noting state and local participation in widespread immigration home raids in 
Otero, New Mexico, as part of Operation Stone Garden). 
 237. See, e.g., United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[N]othing in the text 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1357 provides an independent statutory remedy of suppression for failing to obtain 
an administrative [arrest] warrant. Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in reading 
such a remedy into the statute. Because the statute authorizing ICE agents to arrest persons for 
immigration violations . . . does not require the application of the exclusionary rule to violations 
of the statute, we hold that the district court erred in suppressing Abdi’s statements and the 
derivative evidence based on the Government’s failure to comply with the statute.” (citation 
omitted)). For reasons explored infra, noncitizens often also lack a remedy under the federal 
constitution as a result of the Lopez-Mendoza decision. 
 238. Unlawful presence is a civil, not a criminal, violation. See ALISON SISKIN ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 8 & n.33 
(2006). 
 239. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 240. Courts have found, however, coerced confessions to be suppressible. Bong Youn Choy 
v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1960). 
 241. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006). 
 242. See, e.g., Sioban Albiol, R. Linus Chan & Sarah J. Diaz, Re-Interpreting Postville: A 
Legal Perspective, 2 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 31, 70 (2008) (noting the limited access to counsel for 
Postville detainees); Preston, supra note 34 (discussing the lawsuit in the Tennessee home raids 
case); Katherine F. Riordan, Comment, Immigration Law: Enforcing Administrative Exhaustion 
Requirements for Pattern and Practice Claims Concerning Due Process Violations During 
Immigration Raids—Aguilar v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 42 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 377, 385 & n.54 (2009); Letter from Kathleen Campbell Walker, President, 
and Jeanne Butterfield, Executive Dir., AILA, to Linda R. Reade, C.J., U.S. Dist. Court for the 
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For criminal violators, Miranda warnings are required in 
situations involving custodial interrogations, and an individual has the 
right to remain silent in response to questioning, as well as the right to 
have an attorney present during questioning.243 But the incentives for 
immigration enforcement officials to provide warnings are lower than 
in standard criminal cases because the government can still use any 
evidence obtained in violation of Miranda in civil deportation 
proceedings.244 The absence of an exclusionary rule in removal 
proceedings for evidence obtained in violation of Miranda provides 
another means of using the illegally obtained testimony of a 
noncitizen as evidence against that noncitizen in a highly punitive, 
albeit civil, proceeding. 
Compounding the disjuncture between civil and criminal 
procedures is the gap in remedies when violations of applicable rights 
do occur. 
B. The Remedy Gap: The Absence of the Suppression Remedy in 
Removal Proceedings 
Not only do fewer constitutional protections apply in civil 
proceedings, but those constitutional protections that do apply—in 
particular the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search 
and seizure—do not carry the same remedies in civil removal 
proceedings as in criminal cases. This is a consequence of the 
Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in the case of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
 
N. Dist. of Iowa (May 19, 2008), available at http://www.aila.org/ Content/default.aspx?docid= 
25440. 
 243. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45. Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, they should also be informed of their right to contact their consular representative, 
but the Supreme Court has recently made this another right without a remedy in the United 
States. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356–57 (2008). In Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 
1346 (2008), the Supreme Court acknowledged the International Court of Justice decision in 
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), in 
which the ICJ found the United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Convention by 
failing to inform criminal defendants of their right to contact their consulate when accused of a 
crime. The Court concluded, however, that the ICJ decision was not enforceable in a state court 
to preempt state limitations on filing successive habeas petitions, notwithstanding the 
president’s Memorandum directing enforcement, because the decision was not “self-executing”; 
the remedy under the treaty is referral to the U.N. Security Council. Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356–
57; see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006) (declining to suppress 
statements obtained without informing the noncitizen of his rights under Vienna Convention 
Article 36 to consular notification and communication). 
 244. See, e.g., Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056–57 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that 
Miranda warnings are not required in deportation proceedings). 
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in which the Court addressed the question of whether the 
exclusionary rule should be applied in civil deportation proceedings.245 
The Court first noted that suppression was not typically applied 
in civil proceedings unless the social benefits of excluding unlawfully 
seized evidence outweighed the cost of lost evidence.246 In this case, 
the Court found that the deterrence value of the rule would be slight. 
First, in most cases, the government would have alternative means of 
establishing the facts to which the suppressed evidence pertained.247 
Second, “[e]very INS agent knows . . . that it is highly unlikely that 
any particular arrestee will end up challenging the lawfulness of his 
arrest in a formal deportation proceeding.”248 
But the third and “perhaps most important” reason the Court 
concluded that suppression would offer little deterrence was that “the 
INS has its own comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth 
Amendment violations by its officers.”249 Internal INS training, 
supervision, regulations, and disciplinary procedures for immigration 
officers were together sufficient to guard against Fourth Amendment 
violations.250 And because a single agency perpetrated the violations, 
declaratory relief would be more effective than case-by-case post hoc 
suppression.251 Thus, although the Fourth Amendment limitations on 
searches and seizures clearly applied to the actions of government 
officials engaged in immigration enforcement, when those officials 
violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court declined to require 
 
 245. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984). Until 1996, immigration 
proceedings to prevent noncitizens from entering the country were termed “exclusion” 
proceedings, whereas proceedings to remove a noncitizen that had already entered the country 
were termed “deportation” proceedings. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 420–
21. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 consolidated 
exclusion and deportation, and labeled the resulting proceedings “removal” proceedings. 
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §§ 304, 308, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 to -597, 3009-614 
to -625 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006), and 18 
U.S.C. § 1015(e)–(f) (2006)). Now, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3) indicates that the removal proceedings 
defined in that section are for determining “whether an alien may be admitted to the United 
States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.” This Article 
therefore uses the term “removal” to refer to deportation and exclusion. 
 246. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042. 
 247. Id. at 1042–43. 
 248. Id. at 1044. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 1044–45. 
 251. Id. at 1045. 
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suppression of the fruits of an illegal search or seizure in civil 
immigration proceedings.252 
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Lopez-Mendoza 
considered the possibility that the legal landscape could change in 
ways that would require revisiting the decision, writing that its 
“conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if 
there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment 
violations by INS officers were widespread.”253 Michael Wishnie 
reviewed the conduct of the INS in the period after the Lopez-
Mendoza decision and reached the conclusion that the need for the 
suppression remedy in removal proceedings had become clear in light 
of widespread abuses.254 More recently, Stella Burch Elias has 
persuasively argued that the Supreme Court’s “widespread violation” 
standard in Lopez-Mendoza has been met, requiring the 
reinstatement of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings.255 
Nor are academics the only ones making this argument: noncitizens 
have begun to argue for the applicability of the suppression remedy in 
immigration proceedings on the ground that the government’s actions 
meet the widespread-violation standard set forth in Lopez-Mendoza, 
warranting the application of the exclusionary rule in immigration 
proceedings.256 
The Lopez-Mendoza plurality also allowed that suppression 
would be warranted—even in civil immigration proceedings—in cases 
 
 252. Id. at 1050–51. 
 253. Id. at 1050. 
 254. Wishnie, supra note 84, at 1102–11 (arguing that national and local data of INS racial 
profiling data may “compel reconsideration” of Lopez-Mendoza); cf. Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note, 
The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 843, 861 
(1998) (making a very broad claim that all INS violations are race based, and therefore 
egregious, so as to require suppression under Lopez-Mendoza).  
 255. Stella Burch Elias, Good Reason to Believe: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the 
Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. 
REV. 1109, 1115. 
 256. See Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 131 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“In 
their submissions to the Court, petitioners argue for the first time that Fourth Amendment 
violations by immigration authorities are so widespread as to make exclusion appropriate in 
these circumstances. Because they did not raise the issue before the [Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA)], it has not been exhausted and is therefore not appropriately before us.”); see 
also Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2008) (acknowledging the petitioner’s 
argument regarding the widespread nature of Fourth Amendment violations but declining to 
review the claim due to Melnitsenko’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies by raising 
the argument before the BIA). The author was also asked to consult on a pending immigration 
matter involving multiple suppression motions in which counsel has raised an argument 
concerning the widespread nature of ICE Fourth Amendment violations. 
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involving “egregious” violations of the Fourth Amendment.257 
Noncitizens have occasionally been able to argue successfully for the 
suppression of evidence in immigration proceedings based on 
egregious violations. Examples of violations that courts have found to 
be “egregious” have included stops made solely on the basis of race258 
or of name.259 Interestingly, the number of circumstances that some 
courts are willing to cognize as “egregious violations” has increased a 
bit in recent years. Courts have applied the standard to suppress 
evidence in cases involving warrantless, nonconsensual entries in 
which a show of force is used,260 and have suggested that it would 
apply to “severe” seizures without adequate justification.261 
Applying Lopez-Mendoza, courts have also suppressed evidence 
in cases involving conduct that, although not “egregious,” still 
“undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.”262 Under this 
standard, the Second Circuit suppressed evidence obtained in lengthy 
custodial interrogations involving substantial sleep deprivation and a 
failure to warn the noncitizen of his right to counsel.263 In numerous 
other cases involving alleged failures to provide Miranda warnings 
and the absence of counsel, however, the courts have declined to 
suppress the resulting testimonial evidence.264 
The case law defining what constitutes an “egregious violation” 
suggests that immigration judges ruling on these issues must 
determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, and if so, 
whether that violation was egregious. Thus, ironically, although the 
Lopez-Mendoza Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule in 
 
 257. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050. 
 258. Melnitsenko, 517 F.3d at 47; Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994); 
see also Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234–37 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that a stop 
solely on the basis of race would constitute an “egregious violation,” but finding that the 
petitioner’s mere assertion was insufficient to establish that the stop was race based). 
 259. Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 260. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied 
sub nom. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2009); Evans, supra note 140, at 
556–57, 557 n.52 (discussing suppression motions granted in five cases based on illegal home 
searches and seizures); see also Peitrzak v. Mukasey, 260 F. App’x 334, 340 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(suggesting that a nighttime, warrantless home entry could constitute an “egregious” violation). 
 261. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235. 
 262. Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 263. Id. at 215–16. 
 264. See, e.g., Martins v. Att’y Gen., 306 F. App’x 802, 804–05 (3d Cir. 2009); Lucero v. 
Mukasey, 272 F. App’x 612, 613 (9th Cir. 2008) (mem.) (declining suppression when there was 
no evidence that the statements were involuntary). 
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removal proceedings to keep deportation decisions “streamlined,”265 
in cases in which allegations of constitutional violations are raised, 
immigration judges must still confront suppression questions that 
require the application of a complex body of constitutional law. 
Notably, in declining to apply the suppression remedy in 
immigration proceedings, the Lopez-Mendoza Court assumed that 
the government agents committing the constitutional violations in 
question would be INS officials.266 This assumption was central to the 
Court’s conclusion that the law afforded adequate alternative 
remedies to suppression.267 Like many of the other underpinnings of 
the Lopez-Mendoza case, this is no longer a valid assumption. 
C. Assessing the Impact of the Rights and Remedies Gaps 
Allegations of ICE misconduct in various court proceedings in 
Arizona,268 California,269 Connecticut,270 Massachusetts,271 Minnesota,272 
Ohio,273 New York,274 and Texas,275 among other states,276 speak to the 
 
 265. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984). 
 266. Id. at 1045. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Complaint, Slaughter v. DHS, No. 2:09-cv-00433-SRB (D. Ariz. Mar. 4, 2009). 
 269. E.g., Complaint for Violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Demand for Jury Trial, Reyes v. Alcantar, No.4:07-cv-02271-SBA (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 26, 2007) (alleging the unlawful detention of a seven-year-old citizen in the course of 
ICE raids); see also Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en 
banc denied sub nom. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an 
INS violation of Fourth Amendment rights in Fresno, California, required suppression of 
evidence); Comm. for Immigrants Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp. 
2d 1177, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (order granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss) (describing the plaintiffs’ allegation that ICE agents unlawfully targeted 
individuals who appeared to be Latino) . 
 270. Esther Zuckerman & Colin Ross, Immigrants Sue Feds over 2007 Raids, YALE DAILY 
NEWS, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/city-news/2009/10/28/immigrants-sue-
feds-over-2007-raid/. 
 271. See Aquilar v. ICE, 490 F. Supp. 2d 42, 43 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2007) (alleging rights violations during the New Bedford raid). 
 272. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Barrera v. 
DHS, No. 0:07-cv-03879-JNE-SRN (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2007) (alleging rights violations during the 
Swift plant raid); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Arias v. ICE, 
No. 0:07-cv-01959-ADM-JSM (D. Minn. Apr. 19, 2007) (raising allegations of violations of the 
Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. citizen children during ICE home raids). 
 273. Emergency Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Writ of Mandamus, Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Motion for a Stay of Removal, Martinez v. Chertoff, No. 
1:07-cv-00722-SJD-TSH (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2007) (alleging rights violations during a workplace 
raid). 
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need for greater remedies to curb abusive practices by ICE in 
conducting searches, executing warrants, and making arrests. Yet 
section 287(g) instead enables ICE to supervise state and local 
government officials acting under the auspices of ICE, thereby 
extending rather than containing the risk of rights violations. More 
troublingly, the evidence suggests that at least some state and local 
law enforcement officers, whether trained under the 287(g) programs 
or not, are disregarding the procedural protections that they are 
required to afford to the noncitizens they encounter in their official 
capacity. 
Under section 287(g) agreements, the INA’s statutory and 
regulatory guidelines govern the conduct of officials enforcing 
immigration law.277 Therefore, the different standards that apply in 
immigration enforcement, as distinct from ordinary criminal policing, 
extend to state and local police. Moreover, to the extent that the cases 
resulting from immigration enforcement actions are civil removal 
proceedings, Lopez-Mendoza severely limits remedies for 
constitutional violations. 
Perhaps it is therefore unsurprising that state and local 
participation in immigration enforcement pursuant to section 287(g) 
agreements has generated criticisms stemming from what critics have 
decried as unprofessional and even illegal policing tactics.278 A 
 
 274. Class Action Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Aguilar v. ICE, No. 07-CIV-8224 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007) (alleging rights violations in the course of raids relating to “Operation 
Return to Sender”). 
 275. Original Complaint, Valenzuela v. Swift Beef Co., No. 3:06-cv-02322 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 
15, 2006); Complaint, Swift & Co. v. ICE, No. 2:06-cv-00314-J (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2006); 
Original Complaint—Class Action Request for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Damages, 
United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. Chertoff, No. 2:07-cv-00188-J (N.D. Tex. 
Sept. 12, 2007) (alleging rights violations during the Swift plant raid). 
 276. See Elias, supra note 255, at 1129–31 (discussing lawsuits and media accounts of 
constitutional rights violations by ICE across the country); Ward, supra note 185, at 45 
(“[W]ithin the last year, ICE has been sued at least four times—the latest in New Jersey—for 
allegedly entering homes without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 277. INA § 287(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1357(g)(1) (2006) (allowing the participating state agent to 
“perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension or 
detention”); id. § 1357(g)(8) (extending federal tort liability standards to participating state 
agents). It is an oddity that section 287(g) effectively allows localities—which are not federally 
recognized constitutional entities—to contract around the constitutional investigative 
restrictions imposed upon their agents by their states, which are federally recognized 
constitutional entities. See Su, supra note 85, at 1629 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution does not define 
the legal or political role of localities.”). 
 278. See, e.g., GLADSTEIN ET AL., supra note 116, at 29 (identifying six concerns with 
agreements under the program, namely, that (1) they damage immigrants’ safety and civil 
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recurring concern is that state and local law enforcement officers 
empowered to enforce immigration laws have engaged and will 
continue to engage in racial profiling targeting Latinos.279 The most 
egregious example to date to confirm this concern is that of the police 
department of Maricopa County, Arizona, headed by Sheriff Joe 
Arpaio, whose agency stopped so many Latinos after the signing of 
the 287(g) agreement that the mayor of Phoenix called for a federal 
investigation of his practices, and then-Governor Janet Napolitano of 
Arizona called for the end of the contract.280 As Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security, Napolitano more recently 
oversaw the cancellation of Maricopa County’s 287(g) agreement.281 
Sheriff Arpaio appeared to conclude this would have little impact on 
his ability to enforce federal immigration law.282 
 
liberties; (2) they distract police from their primary crime-fighting responsibilities; (3) police 
lack the necessary training; (4) they encourage racial profiling; (5) the National Crime 
Information Center database upon which the program relies contains too much incorrect 
information; and (6) they will make immigrants reluctant to cooperate with the police and 
report information about crimes out of fear of removal). But see Peter H. Schuck, Taking 
Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 74–75 (arguing that these concerns 
do not justify “categorical opposition” to 287(g) agreements). 
 279. See Rodríguez, supra note 85, at 635 (“[T]he possibility of racial profiling of Latinos 
and mistaken identity rises substantially with state and local involvement.”); Carrie L. Arnold, 
Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to Federal 
Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 116 (2007) (concluding that federal training was 
unlikely to eradicate racial profiling in enforcement under 287(g) agreements); cf. Wishnie, 
supra note 84, at 1102 (noting the increased likelihood of racial profiling when state and local 
police become involved in immigration enforcement). 
 280. See Chris Kahn, Governor Pushes for Bigger Effort to Crackdown on Felons, 
AZCENTRAL.COM, May 14, 2008, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/05/13/20080513 
napolitano0513-ON.html (“Governor Janet Napolitano has ordered the state to end an anti-
illegal immigration contract with the Maricopa County sheriff so she can pay for a larger effort 
to track down thousands of felons around Arizona. Sheriff Joe Arpaio on Tuesday criticized the 
governor’s decision as a maneuver to thwart his efforts against illegal immigrants.”); Phoenix 
Mayor Seeks DOJ Investigation of Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 85 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1292, 1292–93 (2008) (noting the mayor’s concern that Sheriff Arpaio was engaged in 
racial profiling); see also Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (D. Ariz. 2009) 
(denying motion to dismiss allegations of racial profiling in traffic stops to ask auto occupants 
about their immigration status). 
 281. Nicholas Riccardi, Arizona Sheriff Ups the Ante Against His Foes, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-joe-arpaio12-2009dec12,0,2123666. 
story?page=2/ (“In October, the federal Department of Homeland Security revoked the 287(g) 
for Arpaio’s street operations, though he could continue to question jail inmates about their 
immigration status.”). 
 282. Id. (“The day after the federal government told Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio 
that he could no longer use his deputies to round up suspected illegal immigrants on the street, 
the combative Arizona sheriff did just that.”). 
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Although Maricopa County may be an extreme case, it is not an 
isolated example. Similar profiling concerns have been raised in other 
counties with 287(g) agreements.283 Thus, the training programs that 
ICE is providing may be insufficient to curb racial profiling, which has 
a long history of surfacing when local law enforcement becomes 
engaged in immigration enforcement. Compounding the lack of 
training is a lack of sufficient federal oversight, not only with regard 
to the specific issue of racial profiling, but with regard to 287(g) 
program objectives and operations more generally.284 
As less formalized modes of cooperation, such as the Secure 
Communities initiative, rapidly expand, it is worth noting that the 
lack of alignment between procedural remedies in the criminal and 
civil contexts may have specific consequences for these programs as 
well. It is true that they do not increase the powers of state and local 
officials, but they do create a potential shelter for illegal government 
conduct in the form of civil removal proceedings. An illegal arrest or 
interrogation carried out by a local police officer will, for all of the 
reasons just stated, be without a remedy in removal proceedings if the 
noncitizen is removable and his matter is funneled into immigration 
proceedings.285 Unless an immigration judge is prepared to rule that 
 
 283. See, e.g., Sherry Greenfield, Authorities Announce Changes to the Controversial 287(g) 
Program, The Policies and Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement Laws: 287(g) Program in 
North Carolina, AMER. C.L. UNION N.C., Feb. 18, 2009, http://acluofnc.org/?q=new-study-finds-
dramatic-problems-287g-immigration-program; Andrea Simmons, Is Sheriff a Hero or Racial 
Profiler?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 12, 2009, at A1 (“The ACLU of Georgia has compiled 
into a report the accounts of 10 people who had experiences of racial profiling in Cobb County, 
along with interviews of five community activists or attorneys.”). 
 284. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 5 (noting that the program 
lacked documented objectives, that ICE “has not described the nature and extent of its 
supervision . . . which has led to wide variation in the perception of the nature and extent of 
supervisory responsibility among ICE field officials and officials from the participating 
agencies,” and that ICE “did not define what data should be tracked or how it should be 
collected and reported”). 
  Another concern raised by 287(g) agreements is that law enforcement participation in 
immigration enforcement may strain the ability of participating local police departments to 
focus on crime control. When local law enforcement officers are engaged in immigration 
enforcement, they are not available to conduct investigations and detentions in cases involving 
violent crime. At the same time, many of the immigration violators whom they detain are not 
engaged in criminal activity, raising questions about whether immigration enforcement 
constitutes the most effective use of local resources. See, e.g., GLADSTEIN, supra note 116, at 5 
(“Historically, police departments primarily concerned themselves with enforcement of criminal 
law, while the federal government had exclusive responsibility for addressing civil immigration 
violations.”). 
 285. In contrast, if immigration agents conduct illegal arrests and the matter winds up in 
criminal court rather than immigration court, judges in criminal cases are in a position to police 
CHACON IN FINAL.DOC 4/28/2010  5:12:36 PM 
2010] A DIVERSION OF ATTENTION? 1619 
the illegal state action was “egregious” and that the evidence should 
be suppressed despite the fact that the action in question was not 
undertaken by ICE but rather by state officials, there will be no 
redress for constitutional violations. 
Although agents of the INS’s successor agencies—Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection—are 
still the primary enforcers of immigration law, state and local law 
enforcement agents throughout the country now participate in 
immigration enforcement activities.286 In Mapp v. Ohio,287 the 
Supreme Court concluded that unless the exclusionary rule were 
applied to state and local law enforcement in criminal proceedings, 
“the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral 
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom 
from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this 
Court’s high regard as a freedom ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.’”288 As these same actors come to play a central role in 
enforcing immigration laws, it seems apparent that the Fourth 
Amendment rights discussed in Mapp risk ephemeral status in a 
significant number of law enforcement actions. The gap between the 
rights and remedies available in criminal proceedings and those 
available in civil removal cases raises the genuine possibility that 
immigrants whose constitutional rights are violated will be served to 
ICE on a silver platter for removal.289 
 
the conduct of these officers through the imposition of the exclusionary rule in state court 
criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Rangel-Portillo, 586 F.3d 376, 381, 383 (5th Cir. 
2009) (reversing the conviction based on evidence obtained by CBP in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and subsequently introduced in federal criminal court); State v. Maldonado-
Arreaga, 772 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (suppressing biographical information 
provided by a noncitizen detainee after a warrantless raid by ICE Fugitive Operations Team 
agents). 
 286. See supra Part II. 
 287. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). 
 288. Id. at 655. 
 289. See, e.g., In re Sanchez, No. A 98 300 503, slip op. at 5–6 (Immigration Ct. Hartford, 
Conn. Jan. 31, 2008) (order denying the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to 
terminate removal proceedings) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that even if the 
court accepted Sanchez’s claim that he was illegally arrested by local law enforcement prior to 
being turned over to ICE for removal, “the exclusionary rule does not apply . . . because ICE 
merely relied in good faith on the evidence gathered by [the Danbury Police 
Department]. . . . [E]ven if the DPD obtained information from the Respondent in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule would not apply to bar said evidence from the 
current [removal] proceeding”). 
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D. More Rights Gaps Ahead? Lower Protections for Noncitizens in 
Criminal Proceedings 
There is also some indication that the slippage in procedural 
protections threatens to spread from immigration court to the 
criminal court. Although the law has long provided constitutional 
criminal procedural protections to citizens and noncitizens alike, 
some troubling developments in criminal courts suggest that courts 
will be less zealous in protecting the rights of noncitizens in criminal 
proceedings. This may in part be a result of the normalization of 
lower procedural protections that has been established in the civil 
realm, and that has persisted even as civil removal proceedings have 
become increasingly punitive.290 
First, some courts have begun to raise doubts about the 
applicability of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures to certain noncitizens even in criminal 
proceedings. Federal District Court Judge Cassell of Utah has handed 
down the most visible of these decisions. In United States v. Esparza-
Mendoza,291 Judge Cassell concluded that the “persons” protected by 
the Fourth Amendment did not include certain unauthorized 
migrants.292 
In reaching this decision, Judge Cassell relied on the Supreme 
Court’s earlier ruling in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,293 in which 
the majority of the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, 
concluded that Fourth Amendment protections did not apply to 
prevent the illegal seizure of a noncitizen not present on U.S. soil at 
the time of the seizure.294 The Supreme Court had declined to apply 
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures to a 
Mexican national who was apprehended in Mexico and brought to 
trial in the United States.295 In Esparza-Mendoza, Judge Cassell 
reasoned that the holding applied equally to certain noncitizens 
actually present on U.S. soil. He concluded that a noncitizen who had 
reentered the United States in violation of a prior removal order 
 
 290. Legomsky, supra note 43, at 512. 
 291. United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003). 
 292. Id. at 1265. 
 293. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 294. Id. at 269. 
 295. Id. at 262. 
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lacked sufficient connection to the political community to be a part of 
the “people” that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.296 
Critics have contended that Judge Cassell’s conclusion is 
supported neither by the text nor by the history of the Fourth 
Amendment.297 Nevertheless, at least one other court has followed the 
lead taken by Judge Cassell in reasoning that Fourth Amendment 
protections do not apply to certain noncitizens.298 This is not yet a 
widespread phenomenon,299 but it is important, because as the number 
of criminal prosecutions for immigration crimes rises, the possibility 
of a broad exception to the rules of criminal procedure in cases 
involving unauthorized noncitizens could have an impact not only on 
ICE conduct, but also on the conduct of state and local police. No 
longer deterred by the federal exclusionary rule, which would require 
the suppression of evidence in cases involving illegal searches, police 
at all levels of government might be more inclined to conduct 
warrantless searches in cases in which the target of the search is 
undocumented.300 This would be true whether the nature of the 
investigation was criminal or civil. 
Second, the criminal courts have recently become the sites of 
mass plea agreements related to immigration enforcement.301 These 
 
 296. Id. at 271. 
 297. See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, Exploring the Use of the Word “Citizen” in Writings on the 
Fourth Amendment, 83 IND. L.J. 1557, 1581–83 (2008); see also VICTOR C. ROMERO, 
ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 69–75 
(2005) (criticizing the reasoning of Esparza-Mendoza); Kalhan, supra note 35, at 1195 n.229 
(noting that the Esparza-Mendoza decision rests on an interpretation of Verdugo-Urquidez that 
is inconsistent with Justice Kennedy’s outcome-decisive plurality opinion); Kal Raustiala, The 
Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2523 (2005) (critiquing the reasoning of this 
and other cases as relying on a conception of rights that “is not especially consistent with 
American practice”). 
 298. See United States v. Gutierrez-Casada, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1265–67 (D. Kan. 2008); 
see also Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 09-97, 2009 WL 1511176, at *2 (May 22, 2009) (relying on 
both Gutierrez-Casada and Esparza-Mendoza in outlining the applicable rights of noncitizens). 
 299. More widespread, but as yet of uncertain impact, is the tendency of courts to refer in 
dicta to Fourth Amendment rights as the rights of “citizens.” See Medina, supra note 297, at 
1557. This reading, taken literally, would be even narrower than Judge Cassell’s reading because 
it would exclude not only unauthorized noncitizens, but all noncitizens, including both lawful 
permanent residents and nonimmigrants present on temporary visas. To date, no one has 
argued that such a reading of the Fourth Amendment is correct, but the casual imposition of a 
citizenship requirement into the doctrines concerning Fourth Amendment protections is 
troubling. 
 300. The exclusionary rule has long been considered a critical factor in Fourth Amendment 
compliance. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 665 (1961). 
 301. Chacón, supra note 10, at 145. 
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mass plea agreements are dehumanizing at best, and at worst 
abrogate defendants’ due process rights. One reviewing court has 
acknowledged that such procedures simply do not comport with 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.302 Nevertheless, tens of 
thousands of immigrants have been—and presumably will continue to 
be—processed in these insufficient proceedings because the courts 
have made no move to provide a remedy for the procedural 
violations.303 
E. Why Worry Now? 
Several legal and demographic trends are converging that create 
a renewed need to examine the procedural protections that apply in 
the context of immigration law enforcement. First, immigration 
enforcement in the interior of the United States (as opposed to at the 
border) is on the rise.304 Second, there is a substantial and growing 
number of noncitizens present in the United States potentially subject 
to ICE jurisdiction.305 Finally, local, state, and federal law 
enforcement officers are increasingly using immigration law as a 
means of achieving criminal law enforcement goals.306 The increasing 
participation of state and local law enforcement officials in internal 
immigration law enforcement both reflects and reifies this third trend. 
Immigration control has become not only an objective of law 
enforcement, but also a tool for achieving crime-control goals more 
generally. 
Even as the goals of criminal and immigration law enforcement 
converge, the procedural rules that govern them remain divergent. 
The procedural rules that constrain the actions of government 
officials engaged in immigration enforcement are slightly less 
restrictive than comparable rules in criminal law enforcement. The 
absence of a suppression remedy in removal proceedings also means 
that there is less deterrence for violating those rules than would be 
the case in a criminal investigation. Growing evidence suggests that 
these gaps between the rights and remedies available to noncitizens in 
removal proceedings and those available to noncitizens in criminal 
proceedings have encouraged more aggressive forms of policing in 
 
 302. United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 303. Id.; see also Chacón, supra note 10, at 137 (discussing this issue). 
 304. See supra Part I.A. 
 305. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra Part II.B. 
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immigrant communities.307 As the relaxed procedural norms that have 
long applied to immigration enforcement make their way into the 
daily policing of immigrant neighborhoods, the erosion of criminal 
procedural protections that began with the aggressive war on drugs of 
the 1980s and 1990s now continues as a byproduct of immigration 
enforcement. 
IV.  SOLUTIONS 
The final Part of this Article proposes policy reforms to address 
the procedural problems previously identified. The application of the 
exclusionary rule to removal proceedings is a meritorious proposal to 
address the procedural problems previously discussed, and it is 
considered in Section IV.A. 
Even if the exclusionary rule were applied in immigration 
proceedings, however, immigration courts would still lack the 
authority and capacity to address many of the rights violations 
occurring in the course of immigration enforcement. Immigration 
courts are overburdened and largely untrained in Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence. They also may lack jurisdiction over 
fundamental constitutional questions. Compounding the problems in 
immigration courts, federal district courts are increasingly declining 
to exercise jurisdiction over the civil class action claims that might 
serve as another deterrent to official misconduct in immigration 
policing. And the agencies responsible for immigration policing are 
not subject to the kind of oversight that the Lopez-Mendoza Court 
seemed to suggest was essential to preventing widespread rights 
abuses. 
Therefore, Part IV.B includes a discussion of the need for 
comprehensive reform to the immigration adjudication structure, and 
provides some guiding principles for such reform. Finally, Part IV.C 
identifies mechanisms for increasing the oversight of immigration 
policing outside of the immigration court system through expanded 
availability of class action remedies in federal district court and 
through improved agency oversight procedures for federal 
immigration enforcement agents. The proposals are not 
comprehensive; this Article seeks only to illustrate the need for more 
systematic reforms to address the rights violations discussed above, 
and to provide some preliminary guidelines for such reforms. 
 
 307. See supra Part III.C. 
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A. Applying the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Proceedings 
In recent years, several commentators have concluded that the 
evidence of increasing constitutional violations by immigration 
enforcement officials requires the application of the exclusionary rule 
in immigration proceedings.308 Certainly, if the reasoning of Lopez-
Mendoza is taken at face value, it seems that a strong case can be 
made for doing so.309 Indeed, a growing number of the violations 
taking place are not committed by federal immigration officials, but 
by the very state and local law enforcement agencies that the 
Supreme Court previously determined would require deterrence 
through the exclusionary rule.310 
Although the application of the exclusionary rule seems logical 
given the evolution of the nature of immigration enforcement and the 
purpose of removal proceedings, it is also important to recognize that 
the exclusion remedy will be of only limited effectiveness in the 
context of removal proceedings for at least three reasons. First, 
because the government is not required to provide counsel to 
noncitizens in civil immigration proceedings, a significant number of 
individuals in removal proceedings are not represented by counsel.311 
Although representation by counsel is not a necessary predicate for 
raising an argument for the exclusion of illegally seized evidence, it 
seems unlikely that noncitizens representing themselves generally will 
have the capacity to raise this kind of claim in removal proceedings. 
Second, in many removal proceedings, the nature of the evidence 
illegally seized ensures that even when suppression occurs, the 
noncitizen will still be removable.312 Thus, in many cases in which the 
 
 308. Elias, supra note 255, at 1114; Wishnie, supra note 84, at 1102–11; Hafetz, supra note 
254, at 845; Matthew S. Mulqueen, Note, Rethinking the Role of the Exlcusionary Rule in 
Removal Proceedings, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2008). 
 309. See Elias, supra note 255, at 1114; Mulqueen, supra note 308, at 1160. 
 310. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 311. See infra notes 332–36 and accompanying text. 
 312. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1035–36 (1984) (noting that many facts in the I-
213 will not be subject to suppression); see also Kalhan, supra note 35, 1189–91 (discussing the 
fact that much evidence will be admissible even if illegally seized). It is important to note, 
however, that in at least some circuits, identity evidence seized illegally is suppressible. Compare 
United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 2007) (deciding that Lopez-Mendoza 
permits suppression of impermissibly obtained identity information), United States v. Olivares-
Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Lopez-Mendoza as merely reiterating 
a long-standing jurisdictional rule), United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 
2004) (same), and United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754–55 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(same), with United States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2006) (interpreting Lopez-
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government has engaged in unlawful investigatory or detention 
tactics, the incentives for noncitizens to raise suppression arguments 
may be low. This is particularly true because, over the past two 
decades, the Supreme Court has gradually shrunk the sphere of 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights violations requiring suppression 
in criminal cases, and those limits would apply in civil proceedings, 
too, if the exclusionary rule were extended to such proceedings.313 
Third, it is not entirely clear that immigration courts are fully 
empowered to hear claims arising out of Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment violations. Immigration courts are able to decide matters 
involving violations of federal immigration regulations. Although 
such violations do not require application of the suppression remedy, 
immigration courts can terminate proceedings in cases in which a 
regulatory violation prejudices interests protected by the violated 
regulation.314 Presumably, termination might be appropriate in certain 
cases involving violations of regulations protecting noncitizens against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
As previously noted, however, the protections of the federal 
regulations with regard to searches and seizures do not align 
completely with constitutional criminal procedural protections.315 An 
immigration court cannot rule on constitutional challenges to any of 
the federal regulations governing the conduct of an immigration 
enforcement officer or deputized state or local agent. Immigration 
courts can decide constitutional challenges to “procedures that they 
 
Mendoza as barring suppression of evidence of identity), United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 
F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 2005) (same), and United States v. Roque-Villanueva, 175 F.3d 345, 346 
(5th Cir. 1999) (same). 
 313. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 602 (2006) (declining to apply the 
exclusionary rule in a case involving a violation of the well-established “knock and announce” 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) 
(declining to apply the exclusionary rule to physical evidence that was the fruit of an un-
Mirandized statement). 
 314. See, e.g., In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 325, 328 (B.I.A. 1980). At least one 
immigration court has noted, however, that “there is no clear holding sanctioning that a 
violation of a regulation could result in termination of proceedings, thereby allowing a 
respondent to continue his unlawful presence in the United States, absent egregious conduct.” 
In re [redacted], No. [redacted], slip op. at 22 (Immigration Ct. Hartford, Conn. June 2, 2009) 
(order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to terminate removal 
proceedings), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Hartford-
Grant-1-6.2.09.pdf. 
 315. See supra Part III.A. 
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can correct administratively,”316 but not questions of whether the 
regulations themselves are constitutional. And, in spite of 
immigration judges’ long track record of deciding Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment suppression claims, it is actually not entirely clear 
whether Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims raise the kind of 
procedural question that IJs have jurisdiction to consider. Federal 
appellate courts have implicitly approved immigration courts’ rulings 
on constitutional claims,317 but immigration courts frequently buttress 
their Fourth and Fifth Amendment decisions by also finding 
violations of the relevant implementing regulation.318 
Finally, the Lopez-Mendoza Court makes the case that 
immigration judges lack the institutional competency to address these 
claims. In Lopez-Mendoza, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, 
wrote: 
The average immigration judge handles about six deportation 
hearings per day . . . . Neither the hearings officers nor the attorneys 
participating in those hearings are likely to be well versed in the 
intricacies of Fourth Amendment law. The prospect of even 
occasional invocation of the exclusionary rule might significantly 
change and complicate the character of these proceedings.319 
O’Connor goes on to quote from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
brief, which presented suppression issues as “a diversion of attention 
from the main issues which those proceedings were designed to 
resolve.”320 If this conclusion is taken at face value, it raises some very 
pressing concerns. First, because of the increase in immigration 
enforcement, immigration judges’ workload has not decreased since 
1984 despite an increase in their numbers. In 2007, the 214 
 
 316. Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from 
Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 388 (2000). 
 317. See, e.g., Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 127 (2d Cir. 2008); Almeida-Amaral 
v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 318. See, e.g., In re [redacted], No. [redacted], slip op. at 14 (Immigration Ct. L.A., Cal. Jan. 
8, 2010) (order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to terminate removal 
proceedings), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/LA-1-8-
10.pdf (“[T]he Court finds that Respondent experienced both actual and presumptive prejudice 
as a result of the Government’s violations of the regulation under 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.8(b) and 
(c).”). 
 319. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048–49 (1984) (citations omitted). 
 320. Id. at 1048. 
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immigration judges in the United States handled 1,500 cases each.321 
Moreover, the complexity of these cases has increased, because the 
actors involved in immigration enforcement are more numerous and 
come out of a wide variety of agencies. To the extent that “[n]either 
the hearings officers nor the attorneys participating in those hearings 
are likely to be well versed in the intricacies of Fourth Amendment 
law,”322 the current system is virtually assured of creating bad results 
in at least some of the cases in which valid suppression arguments are 
raised. 
At the time that the Lopez-Mendoza Court considered the 
question of whether evidence illegally seized could be used in 
deportation proceedings, they were operating on a relatively blank 
slate. In its decision, the Court noted that “lower court decisions 
dealing with this question [were] sparse,” and cited only three cases.323 
Today, such motions are far more numerous.324 Yet, there is nothing 
to suggest that IJs today receive better training on Fourth 
Amendment law than was the case in 1984. 
This suggests not only that immigration courts are not required 
to suppress illegally seized evidence in matters in which such 
suppression would be required in criminal proceedings, but also that 
the EOIR has made no concerted effort in the years since Lopez-
Mendoza to ensure that these courts will be prepared to deal more 
effectively with these claims as they arise. Given the increasingly 
seamless connections between law enforcement at all levels of 
government and immigration enforcement officials, the ability to 
adequately address suppression issues should now be identified as a 
core competency of the immigration judge and not a peripheral 
diversion of attention. 
 
 321. See Jennifer Ludden, Immigration Crackdown Overwhelms Judges, NPR, Feb. 9, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100420476 (quoting Dana Leigh Marks, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges). 
 322. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048. 
 323. Id. at 1041. 
 324. Elias, supra note 255, at 1126–27 (“EOIR records show that between 1952 and 1979—
the year that the Lopez-Mendoza respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-
Sanchez first appeared in immigration court—fewer than fifty motions to suppress evidence or 
terminate proceedings had ever been filed in immigration court. Twenty-eight years later, in 
2007 alone, 21,144 motions to terminate were granted.”). 
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B. Immigration Court Reform 
The issue of suppression thus raises a larger set of questions 
around immigration court competencies. There can be no doubt that 
immigration judges carry a heavy burden under the system’s current 
structure, even though they do not have to sift through evidentiary 
suppression issues in many matters. 
The immigration court system is also riddled with other problems 
that flow from or compound the issues associated with the heavy 
workload. In recent years, circuit courts have engaged in round 
denunciations of immigration judges’ performances in various 
matters.325 Most notably, Judge Richard Posner was moved to claim 
that adjudication by immigration judges had “fallen below the 
minimum standards of legal justice.”326 Moreover, in recent times, the 
immigration bench has been the subject of political manipulation that 
has raised questions concerning the integrity of the institution as a 
whole.327 The time is ripe for institutional reform.328 
Although a full reform plan is well beyond the scope of this 
Article, the preceding discussion should make clear that any reform 
effort needs to take into account several institutional concerns. First, 
immigration judges should be fully trained to recognize and 
adjudicate constitutional violations that occur during the course of 
ICE investigations. Such training should focus significant attention on 
the substantial role of state and local law officials in immigration 
enforcement efforts, so that judges are prepared to understand the 
complex interaction of actors that may be involved when noncitizens 
appearing before them raise allegations of rights violations. Many 
reform proposals have called for even broader changes to the nation’s 
immigration courts, including the creation of an Article I immigration 
court in which judges would have a guaranteed tenure,329 the removal 
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review from the Justice 
Department to guarantee greater decisional independence,330 and the 
 
 325. Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 
2005, at A1. 
 326. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 327. Emma Schwartz & Jason McLure, DOJ Made Immigration Judgeships Political, LEGAL 
TIMES, May 28, 2007, at 12. 
 328. See Legomsky, supra note 14, at 1637–41 (calling for a restructuring of the immigration 
adjudication system). 
 329. Id. at 1678–81(summarizing and critiquing such proposals). 
 330. Id. at 1683–85 (summarizing and critiquing such proposals). 
CHACON IN FINAL.DOC 4/28/2010  5:12:36 PM 
2010] A DIVERSION OF ATTENTION? 1629 
creation of an independent administrative immigration court system 
whose decisions would be appealable to an Article III immigration 
court.331 These broader proposals are not inconsistent with a narrower 
call for increased training concerning government investigations. Any 
reform agenda ought to include measures to sensitize immigration 
judges to the important role they now must play in policing large 
numbers of the nation’s police. 
Second, noncitizens should be provided with counsel in removal 
proceedings. During the first eight years of the new millennium, over 
eight hundred thousand noncitizens went through removal 
proceedings without access to counsel;332 84 percent of detained 
noncitizens lack counsel.333 A case can be made for not guaranteeing 
all of these noncitizens a right to counsel in civil removal 
proceedings,334 but in many cases, denial of counsel in removal 
proceedings seems to violate basic concepts of procedural fairness 
and due process.335 When a Fourth Amendment violation occurs 
during a search or a seizure, or when a due process violation occurs 
during the government’s interrogation of a noncitizen, unrepresented 
 
 331. Id. at 1686–1721 (offering such a proposal). 
 332. EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 fig.9 (2008), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy07syb.pdf. 
 333. NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND 
PROMOTING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL 
ORIENTATION PROGRAM 1 (2008), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=1780/ 
LOP%2BEvaluation_May2008_final.pdf. 
 334. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated 
Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 289, 345–46 (2008) (arguing for a right to counsel in removal proceedings for 
individuals previously admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents). This 
approach risks providing no counsel to a wide variety of individuals subject to removal who 
might have legitimate due process concerns. For example, this proposal would not apply to an 
H-1B visa holder, present in the U.S. for six years, with strong family and employment ties to 
the country. It would not apply to an unauthorized noncitizen who has been in the country for 
thirty years and has established extensive family ties or a noncitizen who entered the country 
unlawfully as a small child and has never known any other home. Nevertheless, this proposal 
provides a useful starting point for thinking about appropriate cases in which to guarantee the 
right to counsel, and it may be that a good case can be made for denying the right to very recent 
entrants who either lack legal status or whose legal entry is authorized only by short-term 
nonimmigrant visas. See Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to 
Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 114 (2008) (arguing for a right to 
counsel for detained noncitizens in removal proceedings). 
 335. See sources cited supra note 334; see also DONALD KERWIN, MIGRATION POLICY 
INST., INSIGHT NO. 4, REVISITING THE NEED FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL 1, 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf (critiquing the denial of counsel for 
its negative effect on the fairness and legitimacy of the removal process). 
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immigrants are unlikely to be able to adequately address the complex 
legal issues that a suppression motion requires. This is particularly 
true given the fact that immigration judges do not have a long history 
of dealing with these arguments, lack extensive training in these 
matters, and often require in-depth briefing on related issues.336 
C. Reforms Outside of the Immigration Court 
In addition to changing the procedures and structure of 
immigration courts, ensuring adequate policing of the many actors 
now engaged in immigration enforcement will require adjustments to 
institutions outside of the immigration courts. In particular, reforms 
are needed to ensure that two other constitutional safeguards cited by 
the Lopez-Mendoza Court—civil damage remedies and internal 
agency disciplinary measures—operate to provide adequate 
deterrence of constitutional rights violations. 
First, Congress should revisit jurisdictional restrictions that 
prevent courts from hearing pattern-and-practice claims concerning 
ICE practices. As ICE enforcement actions proliferate and expand in 
scope and ambition, it is almost unavoidable that the agency will 
commit occasional rights violations. The possibility of such problems 
is magnified by the recent, large increase in the number of new ICE 
agents,337 many of whom have not completed their training 
requirements before beginning their participation in enforcement 
actions.338 The Lopez-Mendoza Court suggested that civil suits would 
be one way to keep agency action in check in the absence of a 
suppression remedy.339 The rising number of civil actions suggests that 
this is indeed a viable mechanism by which to curb certain abuses of 
power. 
It is important to recognize, however, that Congress has made 
substantial changes to the law since Lopez-Mendoza was decided in 
1984, and these changes have limited the ability of noncitizens to file 
civil actions in cases in which government agents have violated 
constitutional rights in the course of immigration enforcement. In 
particular, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
 
 336. Ward, supra note 185, at 46 (quoting a former attorney advisor for the San Francisco 
Immigration Court for the proposition that immigration judges “often seek significant research” 
in deciding suppression motions). 
 337. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 338. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 20–21. 
 339. See United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1984). 
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Responsibility Act of 1996 enacted limitations to judicial review, and 
the REAL ID Act of 2005 requires administrative exhaustion and 
limits judicial review for certain matters arising out of immigration 
proceedings.340 Some courts have held that the jurisdictional bars 
codified in section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
preclude federal district courts from deciding pattern-and-practice 
claims arising out of ICE enforcement that led to the initiation of 
removal proceedings against the petitioning noncitizens. 
For example, the petitioners in Aguilar v. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement341 had filed a class-wide claim alleging that ICE 
engaged in a pattern and practice of violating due process during 
immigration raids in New Bedford, Massachusetts.342 The petitioners 
argued that the statutory limitations on judicial review did not bar 
their claim because they were not challenging their removal orders, 
but rather were seeking relief arising out of ICE’s illegal conduct.343 
The First Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that the claims 
arose from removal and that petitioners had adequate mechanisms 
for addressing rights violations in removal proceedings.344 This ruling 
captures a broader trend wherein the courts have read class-action 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions broadly in the context of immigration 
law.345 Such interpretations threaten one of the most effective means 
that noncitizens have to challenge illegalities in immigration law and 
procedures.346 
Given the increasing judicial resistance to the suppression 
remedy, and the particular difficulties in suppressing the kinds of 
evidence that are frequently at issue in removal proceedings, civil 
 
 340. INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). See generally Jill E. Family, Another Limit on 
Federal Court Jurisdiction? Immigrant Access to Class-Wide Injunctive Relief, 53 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 11, 23–27 (2006) (discussing IIRIRA’s limitations on federal jurisdiction); Nancy 
Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future? Lessons Learned from Litigation over the 1996 
Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113 (2007) (discussing the legal issues 
raised by the 2005 revisions to the INA’s judicial review provisions). 
 341. Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 342. Id. at 9. For a discussion of the case, see Riordan, supra note 242, at 378–79. 
 343. Riordan, supra note 242, at 378–79. 
 344. Id. (citing Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 10). 
 345. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Threats to the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 110–16 (2008) (discussing Supreme Court interpretations of these 
provisions); see also Motomura, supra note 316, at 414 (arguing for a narrow interpretation of 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions). 
 346. See Family, supra note 345, at 76–81 (discussing the use of class actions for these 
purposes). Immigration reform proposals to date have included provisions seeking to further 
restrict the class action in immigration-related matters. Id. at 118–21. 
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remedies may be the only avenue toward remediation that remains 
available to some noncitizens. Thus, to be truly effective, adoption of 
the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings would need to be 
accompanied by a reduction of the existing barriers to class actions 
arising out of constitutional rights violations in immigration 
enforcement. 
Up to this point, the solutions presented have focused on the 
courts as the site for remediating and deterring constitutional 
violations in immigration enforcement. But the Lopez-Mendoza 
decision correctly notes that internal agency policies are also critical 
to the deterrence and punishment of illegal actions by agents.347 
Unfortunately, there is evidence that the internal investigative and 
disciplinary measures that might help to prevent rights violations are 
in need of fine tuning. Therefore, the final issue tackled in this Article 
is the need for more effective internal measures at the Department of 
Homeland Security to address rights violations by its immigration 
enforcement agents. 
ICE is now the largest law enforcement agency in the country. 
By its own estimation, it also works with tens of thousands of state 
and local law enforcement officials throughout the country. It has the 
ability to initiate removal proceedings against over 10 percent of the 
U.S. population, and its actions affect countless others. Yet, in terms 
of accountability, it looks very different from other large police forces 
in the United States. Whereas about 80 percent of police departments 
in the nation’s fifty largest cities are subject to the oversight of a 
civilian control board,348 ICE has no such oversight mechanism. In 
this, of course, it is very much like other federal law enforcement 
agencies, which have long resisted external review. But as ICE 
becomes a hub for a whole host of state and local law enforcement 
efforts, it seems increasingly important to consider the possibility that 
external oversight might be appropriate and necessary to keeping 
rights violations in check. 
It is also extremely difficult to access the basic statistical data 
about ICE enforcement that would be necessary for any observer to 
effectively monitor the agency’s practice. To ensure compliance with 
constitutional requirements by ICE and the state and local agents 
 
 347. See United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1054 (1984) (discussing the 
importance of the INS’s internal disciplinary scheme for remedying constitutional violations). 
 348. SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT 40 
(2001). 
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who are increasingly charged with assisting in enforcing the nation’s 
immigration laws, it is critical that these agencies be required to retain 
and report data that reveal the nature and effectiveness of their 
enforcement efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
The procedural consequences of ongoing changes in immigration 
enforcement should not be ignored. This Article seeks to highlight 
the genuinely transformative effect that contemporary immigration 
policing arrangements are having on criminal procedural norms. The 
immigration courts provide the institutional space where many of the 
questions over these procedures will be resolved. Unfortunately, 
these institutions cannot effectively address many of the issues that 
are now becoming staples of immigration court adjudication. Even if 
the procedural protections of the criminal realm—such as the 
exclusionary rule—are imported into these institutional settings, it is 
not clear that these tools can be effectively deployed. The 
transformation of immigration policing requires a parallel 
transformation of immigration adjudication. Creating more effective 
oversight mechanisms and reforming immigration adjudication are 
both necessary steps to ensure the adequate policing of those who 
police migration. 
